SECOND EDITION
JANUARY 2005

Becoming an Effective Political Executive:

7 Lessons from Experienced Appointees

2004 Presidential Transition Series

Judith E. Michaels

Including Essays on Working in Washington by:

John H. Trattner, Council for Excellence in Government
Dana Michael Harsell, Hartwick College
Mark A. Abramson, IBM Center for The Business of Government
Paul R. Lawrence, IBM Business Consulting Services

IBM Center for
The Business of Government

2 0 0 4 PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION SERIES

Becoming an Effective Political Executive:

7 Lessons from Experienced Appointees

Judith E. Michaels

Including Essays on Working in Washington by:

John H. Trattner, Council for Excellence in Government
Dana Michael Harsell, Hartwick College
Mark A. Abramson, IBM Center for The Business of Government
Paul R. Lawrence, IBM Business Consulting Services

Second Edition
January 2005

IBM Center for
**The Business
of Government**

T A B L E   O F   C O N T E N T S

FOREWORD

January 2005

On behalf of the IBM Center for The Business of Government, we are pleased to present a new edition of this report by Judith Michaels, "Becoming an Effective Political Executive: 7 Lessons from Experienced Appointees." It has been prepared to assist new political appointees as they enter the political world of Washington.

The report is based on two surveys of previous political appointees, as well as personal interviews with nearly 50 former political executives from both Democratic and Republican administrations. Their experience has been distilled into seven key lessons: turn to your careerists, partner with your political colleagues, remember the White House, collaborate with Congress, think media, pace yourself, and enjoy the job. The report also includes four essays on "Working in Washington."

Ms. Michaels' first lesson is to "turn to your careerists." Nearly 90 percent of those surveyed by Ms. Michaels expressed high levels of satisfaction with their career colleagues. Those surveyed also found careerists to be both competent and responsive. There are, however, others who will give conflicting advice. Some argue that political appointees should rely less on career civil servants and instead rely more on political appointees. Those interviewed for this project reject that point of view, asserting that to be an effective political executive requires building effective working relationships with both career civil servants and political appointees. Ignoring one half of the equation will not work.

Nearly all the political executives interviewed found public service to be a highly rewarding experience. We wish the "Class of 2005" well as they enter or reenter public service. We trust that this report and the advice it contains will prove helpful to new appointees as they begin the life of a political executive.

Paul Lawrence
Partner-in-Charge
IBM Center for The Business of Government
paul.lawrence@us.ibm.com

Albert Morales
Partner and Vice President
IBM Business Consulting Services
albert.morales@us.ibm.com

Part I

Becoming an Effective Political Executive: 7 Lessons from Experienced Appointees

By Judith E. Michaels

Introduction*

Federal service in Washington, D.C., is a unique experience for which no other training can prepare you. Nevertheless, research offers clues about who will do well as appointees, who will enjoy their tenure in the nation's capital, and who will be less than successful. Analysis informs this report, which is offered as a tool for those considering or newly entered into life as a political appointee, in the hopes that you will not only survive but thrive. This report is based on studies of and interviews with Senate-confirmed presidential appointees (PASs) in the fourth year of George H. W. Bush's administration (1992) and in the fourth year of Bill Clinton's first administration (1996).ǂ

The report is organized into the "7 Lessons from Experienced Appointees," each of which discusses specific aspects of appointee work, including relations with career staff and other political appointees, stress, and relations with the White House, the Congress, and the media. It employs survey results, discussion, and direct quotes from political appointees and long-time career executives.

Based on the insights gained from these political appointees and career executives, we arrived at the following "7 Lessons from Experienced Appointees":

1. Turn to Your Careerists
2. Partner with Your Political Colleagues
3. Remember the White House
4. Collaborate with Congress
5. Think Media
6. Pace Yourself
7. Enjoy the Job

Our hope is that you will use this report—and master these habits—to help ensure that your experience in Washington will produce a successful and valuable contribution to public service.

Good luck to you!

ǂ *Unless noted, all quotes are from the author's personal interviews with appointees. Quotes from the Bush appointees are from the author's* The President's Call: Executive Leadership from FDR to George Bush*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997.*

* *The author would like to thank Michael DeMarco, IBM Business Consulting Services, for his assistance in the preparation of this report.*

7 Lessons from Experienced Appointees

1. Turn to Your Careerists

As a presidential appointee, you will learn to relate to a variety of federal employees across many agencies during your time in federal service. Success will come from having the flexibility to know whom to consult and when, and whose judgment to trust. Experience has shown that appointees have much to gain by leading and utilizing the career employees, who too often are labeled as over-protected, inertia-laden, 9-to-5ers whose loyalties presumably lie with the previous administration. More often, though, careerists are very supportive of their boss, accept leadership readily, and identify much more with their agency than with a political party. As a result, most appointees come to rely heavily on their careerists in every aspect of their work, both political and administrative. Many appointees speak of their trust in careerists and how much they depend on them for policy guidance, as well as how they have kept them informed about the culture of their agency.

Some 73 percent of the past appointees surveyed gave a very positive assessment of the competency of their careerists, while 65 percent applied the same assessment to careerists' responsiveness.

Table 1: To What Degree Do You Find Your Career Colleagues to Be Competent and Responsive to Policy Direction?

	Great and Very Great
Competent (N=343)	73%
Responsive (N=339)	65%

Clearly, careerists can be a great help to you throughout your stay in Washington's halls of power. Of course, knowing that the data overwhelmingly supports careerists is one thing; knowing how to utilize your careerists' expertise and, at the same time, understand and minimize the effects of those cultural attributes unique to Washington's career brigade is yet another.

"The assumption of every new political group coming in is that career civil servants are captives of the previous administration.… But the message to political appointees is that they are not going to get their jobs done if they don't work closely with the senior people—and that they shouldn't assume that they are the enemy within."

(From John Trattner, *The 2000 Prune Book: How to Succeed in Washington's Top Jobs* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 23)

— Anonymous

"Appointees are so vulnerable, they can sabotage themselves with an attitude of forcing the careerists or ignoring them.… You should take the time to … get their input and agreement. Build on credibility from past work, call in the experts and get their input … Be a consensus manager rather than a dictator."

— Bill Clinton appointee

"Get the Line People Behind You"

Proper care and feeding of the career staff should be high on appointees' "must do" list from day one. Career employees know how government works, the ins and outs of their agency, and—perhaps most important—how the image game in Washington works.

Perception is reality in the judgmental fishbowl that is political Washington, policed by the cynical and very public eye of the *Washington Post*. And because the rules are different in government, people coming from the private sector can blunder unwittingly and damage themselves by doing something completely acceptable in the business world, such as accepting a free lunch or golf weekend, that is unethical in government service.

A supportive careerist can save an appointee from a costly image and common sense mistake, such as redecorating their office in an agency suffering cutbacks. Of course, a careerist you haven't "cared for" might choose to simply sit and watch as an appointee thrashes about in a tempest of her or his own making. It's up to you to build that relationship from the start through interaction and respect.

But can careerists really be trusted to help you succeed? New appointees, especially new appointees after a party change, naturally will be suspicious of a potential conspiracy. However, our research shows that as a group, careerists want to help their bosses, in large part because they identify with their programs much more so than they identify with the political party of the incoming or outgoing administration. The key is to provide leadership, set a tone for your agency, and understand the way the city operates. For instance, appointees shouldn't take in-house games personally, they just go with the territory. As Bonnie R. Cohen, former under secretary for management in the Department of State and assistant secretary for policy, management and budget at the Department of Interior, said, "Staff do go around me to Congress, but I don't consider that sabotage; it's just the way Washington works."

An appointee does well to look to the knowledge and institutional memory of careerists and to assume going in that they want what is best for their agency and will support the politicals as long as they feel that they receive support in return. One Clinton appointee advised, "Establish a really good rapport with the careerists at the executive level (members of Senior Executive Service, or SES). Recruit a confidential assistant from the career rank within the agency. They will already know the agency, be loyal to you, and know both worlds."

Bonnie Cohen put it in a nutshell when she said, "First, don't undertake a witch hunt. Second, have great respect for the expertise of the career employees—there were 70,000 at Interior. Use them to inform your decisions. Third, get to know the staff on the Hill."

Cohen's advice sounds simple, but, of course, nothing is as easy as it seems. As with any professional niche, D.C.'s careerists have a culture that has evolved over time and that can frustrate and derail appointees who don't maintain perspective.

Leadership Is Needed

Rather than bemoan the problems inherent within the careerists' environment, appointees must immediately get to work to set a direction that compensates for the problems as much as reasonably possible. It's a matter of leadership. The fact is, careerists as a group are like people in any profession, with excellent, average, and poor performers populating each agency. Says one Clinton appointee: "I have found great allies and immovable objects in both camps, career and political … some are top notch, some very poor—it's all in the selection process." The effective appointees will find and best utilize the excellent and average careerists, placing them in the right roles.

Donald Laidlaw, former assistant secretary for human resources and administration in the Department of Education, spoke of the leadership role of the politicals: "Setting the right tone is key. Giving direction is the appointee's job. After all, when the boat misses the harbor it's seldom the harbor's fault. Have fun, establish relations with the career people. They look at us as the Christmas help. You need their support."

After having worked with them, appointees rated the career SESs highly. When asked for specifics, two-thirds to 91 percent of the PASs surveyed rated their career subordinates "generally" or "greatly" helpful in major aspects of their work, such as a mastery of policy, technical, and implementation details, liaison with the bureaucracy and with Congress, and day-to-day management.

Table 2: In Specific Areas, Do Your Career SES Colleagues Help or Hinder Your Work?

	Generally and Greatly Help	Help as Much as Hinder	Generally and Greatly Hinder
Technical analysis of difficult issues	91%	6%	3%
Handling day-to-day management tasks	87%	11%	2%
Mastering substantive policy details	87%	9%	4%
Liaison with the federal bureaucracy	83%	13%	4%
Anticipating potential policy implementation problems	80%	15%	5%
Liaison with Congress	68%	26%	7%

"Careerists have it as part of their culture to support the boss.…Their program identification is very high and they will tend to resist change there.... I have trusting relations with the careerists in the building. They keep me informed about what's going on."

— Anthony McCann, former Assistant Secretary for Management and Budget, Department of Veterans Affairs

"There's a danger of building a wall between yourself and the career staff; you can do damage to the agency if you shut them out. Rely on careerists. They helped me cement my relationship with the career staff, restored relationships, and healed scars left by the previous director, who had alienated careerists."

— Appointee who served both the Bush and Clinton administrations

"My goal is to empower careerists in policymaking, make them stakeholders."

— Deborah Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary, Technology Policy Office, Technology Administration, Department of Commerce

"Motivation is very important for the mission of your agency. If you don't believe in it, if you don't believe it will make a difference in the lives of ordinary people, stop doing it. Go do something else. Because if you don't believe in it, it's going to show to everybody. Everybody will notice that you're there more for the ride than for the goal." *(From Trattner, p. 51)*

— Former White House official

"There is a lot of paranoia on both sides of the political/career divide. Government needs managers who can divide fact from fiction."

— Bill Clinton appointee

"They are a joy to work with. It's a pleasure to try to live up to them by trying my best to be a good leader for them. Most civil servants are here because they like doing the deals, they like the sense of completion, accomplishment."

— Martin Kamarck, former Chair, Export-Import Bank of the United States

"Public servants are obvious targets—your tax dollars pay for them, so you feel you can rough them up. We can't afford the luxury of trashing public servants."

— Charles Baquet, former Deputy Director, Peace Corps

"You can't develop policy without dealing with careerists. On balance they're pretty good; there's a remarkable level of competence considering the level of protection they have."

— Roland R. Vautour, former Under Secretary for Small Community and Rural Development, Department of Agriculture

"The competence of an appointee influences her or his willingness to ask questions, to seek the counsel of careerists. The more competent and self-confident, the more willing to ask questions and seek counsel. There are three areas where appointees trip up the most: their inability to deal with the Congress, the media, and interest groups."

— Constance Berry Newman, current Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, and former Director, Office of Personnel Management

2. Partner with Your Political Colleagues

Political appointees encompass a diversity of skill levels and "political smarts." As in any workplace, you will find some of your colleagues to be very good, while others leave something to be desired. As one Clinton appointee put it: "The good ones have strong interpersonal skills, take great pride in their work, have a good work ethic, people judgement, are consummate professionals and politically savvy. Either they come that way or they pick it up quickly, but they are not politically driven, they have a degree of trust, can work in a situation of give and take, are not excessively authoritarian, work in the pluralism and decentralism in a bureaucracy and know how to make it work. These characteristics come in any variety of people—men, women, gay, straight, black, white, military, civilian."

And, by and large, our respondents thought very highly of their peers and political SES colleagues, as shown in Tables 3 and 4. Appointees consider their colleagues generally to be very competent, and thus consult with them regularly on a wide variety of policy, budget, and personnel issues.

One George H. W. Bush appointee judged the quality of her political peers as good, attributing it partly to "the Senate confirmation that insures better quality. The non-confirmed political staff, on the other hand—the chiefs of staff and special assistants (non-career SES and Schedule C)—are the more troublesome. They are the right-hand person, the closest aide to the secretary, and they often try to push around and dominate the political structure. They operate ruthlessly with the careerists. They aren't in charge of any line operations; they serve their principal and carry personal loyalty only to that person."

Table 3: To What Degree Do You Find Your Political Colleagues to Be Competent and Responsive to Policy Direction?

	Great and Very Great	Moderate	No, Little and Somewhat
PAS			
Competent	76%	17%	7%
Responsive	83%	12%	5%
Non-career SES			
Competent	73%	20%	7%
Responsive	83%	11%	6%

Table 4: How Often Do You Consult With Your Political Colleagues?

	Very Often and Always	Often	Some and Seldom
PAS			
Policy feasibility	71%	17%	12%
Policy formulation and development	74%	14%	12%
Policy implementation	68%	16%	15%
Budget decisions	62%	16%	22%
Personnel decisions	47%	16%	37%
Non-Career SES			
Policy feasibility	63%	19%	17%
Policy formulation and development	64%	18%	18%
Policy implementation	65%	16%	19%
Budget decisions	58%	18%	25%
Personnel decisions	47%	19%	34%

In observing what makes an effective appointee, Charlie Grizzle, former assistant administrator for administration and resources management at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), notes, "The successful ones are open-minded, willing to learn, to trust, they possess a sixth sense of when to delegate and when to make a decision oneself, noting the fine line between responsibility and authority."

He feels that "too many appointees come in with an agenda—they want to accomplish one or two specific things. This is a fatal flaw—you have to deal with everything that's on your plate, you can't let everything else go in the name of your agenda. Your principal task is to manage the organization you inherit. Stewards/managers will have a more lasting impact than cause-oriented appointees. Generalists/political animals (those who understand the political process) will have more success than the apolitical/technical people, who don't have a feel for the political process or how the town or the country works."

Martha A. Krebs, former director, office of energy research at the Department of Energy, said, "The gulf between the assistant secretaries and the front office (the secretary) is pretty wide. The pressures on them are so extraordinary in terms of the president and the Congress. The front office staff (the undersecretary, the deputy secretary, and "the Palace Guard") finds working with the department staff is never as satisfying as getting the guidance from the top. Consequently, I don't get the feedback I need or get it as promptly as I need it. Most of the time, when we see them is when they have to knock our heads together. You don't get their engagement on a positive level, they don't have enough time to do enough of it." Krebs continued, "Being an assistant secretary has limitations on what you can do in an agency. The measure of the job is not the dollars. A cabinet agency is much more complex than I expected. It's hard to get your message up to the front office, harder to get up to them than to the general public. You have to work them the way you work the White House or Congress. Get outside people to support your programs."

As the late Elliot Richardson, who served as secretary in four departments, noted, agency heads' sole responsibility is for the issues under that agency. This makes them less willing to consult other heads, so they're isolated by virtue of the job. He quoted "Miles' Law" (set forth by Rufus Miles, a senior careerist at the former Department of Health, Education and Welfare): "'Where you stand dependson where you sit.' Subsequently, synergy and consistency of programmatic activities have to be lodged in the White House and decision making has to be done by the White House in terms of cabinet committees and issues because each cabinet member is autonomous and nothing can bind them to a plan except a White House decree. However, there's always been a lot of connection among the subcabinet officials."

Ed Timperlake, former assistant secretary for public affairs at the Department of Veterans Affairs, noted, "There is a sense of isolation within the agencies. Henry Kissinger was right when he said, 'The immediate drives out the important.'"

Because political appointee jobs are often the reward for campaign work, places have to be found for as many partisans as possible. Often supporters are given Schedule C positions, but there is a danger in over-using them. Carol A. Bonosaro, president of the Senior Executives Association, mentioned a cabinet secretary who surrounded himself with Schedule Cs. "Maybe it's because he wanted to get things done in a hurry, but it's like putting a moat around the secretary," she said.

Another reason not to rely too much on Schedule Cs was voiced by a Clinton appointee who said, "I prefer not to have Schedule Cs because of the uncertainties of who will choose them and what their agenda is, who they're loyal to, what their skills are."

"If the secretary leaves, there is a revolution within the agency. Cabinet government is dictatorship. The departure of the secretary ends the agenda within the agency. It's life and death for the appointees in the agency. It's less of a problem when lower-level appointees leave; it has less of an impact on the agency."

— Frank Keating, former Governor, State of Oklahoma, and former General Counsel, Department of Housing and Urban Development

"I measure success by the degree of change in an agency: the programs changed, if there are no scathing Inspectors General or GAO reports, if the appointee hasn't done anything to embarrass the administration. Avoid the appearance of scandal, real or trumped-up."

— Charlie Grizzle, former Assistant Administrator for Administration and Resources Management, Environmental Protection Agency

"As an appointee you should help build up your agency and leave it better than when you found it, as opposed to those appointees with no experience in government who want to use it to pursue their own agenda and in a fairly ruthless way. They use people and don't understand how bureaucracy functions. It takes so long to learn that they are gone before they do learn. We can't have two-year training programs in the government, senior officials who show up at the wrong meeting because they want to control everything—they gut their whole hierarchy by taking over and showing up inappropriately at lower-level meetings and taking over. They don't understand the system."

— George H. W. Bush appointee

3. Remember the White House

Relations with the White House, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) require tremendous effort from PASs. Appointees feel a pull outward to the White House and a need to be responsive to the president who appointed them. Further, their rewards come from being a good team player. On the other hand, they feel a strong pull inward to be responsible leaders of their agency. In a time of constricting resources, it is often difficult to reconcile the two demands when, for example, the White House is demanding cutbacks at the expense of agency needs.

Elliot Richardson noted, "This government requires an element of trust and a high degree of comity to work. Washington is a city of cocker spaniels more ready to be loved and petted than to wield power." He continued, "Decision-making is the easiest thing I do, say one-seventh of the job. But once you make a decision you have to get the support of the staff, OPM, OMB, the Hill, interest groups, the president and the general public. All the players have to be at least considered and in some cases brought on board—the complexity of the governing process increases and grows faster than any of the trends that contribute to it.

"The function of the political process is to make choices among competing claims. There are no simple answers or easy decision making and there is no objective way to decide among them. Any politician who doesn't waffle doesn't understand the problem. Politicians should have the imagination and intelligence and empathy to understand the jostling of competing claims." Ginger Ehn Lew, former deputy administrator of the Small Business Administration, noted that in regard to the White House, "It's more a matter of personal relations than anything else, the same for Department of Commerce connections. It helps to have those connections because there's so much personal interaction in Washington."

"The appointee's job is to carry out the policies of the administration, respect the roles of the civil servants, and communicate with them," said Constance Berry Newman, current Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, and former director of the Office of Personnel Management. "Appointees serve only at the pleasure of the president. They can be fired instantly, there's no severance pay, there are two-year restrictions on employment in agencies you dealt with, some lobbying activities are barred for life. Given all this, the job kind of loses its charm."

And what happens when an appointee doesn't make the grade or commits political suicide? Ted Barreaux, former Counselor to the Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, noted, "Sometimes a person is just pushed out, he or she dies the death of a thousand cuts, sometimes self-inflicted." He noted one appointee in the George H. W. Bush administration who had ignored White House personnel suggestions, refused to have a White House liaison until they forced someone on her and then ignored her. She turned to her friends in Congress to do an end run around the White House without telling them she'd already been turned down by the White House and so alienated her Hill support. Eventually, she had no friends left. His ominous warning, "If you alienate the White House, they'll get you. It may take three years, but they'll get you."

The power of OMB should be respected by political appointees. Said one Bill Clinton appointee, "As a manager, I consider OMB a necessary evil. OMB's powers of review are formidable." John Bartlett, former director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management at the Department of Energy notes, "There are 24 steps in the appropriations process, and OMB controls every gate in terms of what the administration brings to the Congress in that interaction."

Frank Keating, former Governor of Oklahoma and former general counsel, Department of Housing and Urban Development, noted, "White House intervention in agency affairs depends on the degree of interest of the president in the agency's issues.… HUD's relationship with OMB is difficult but professional. OMB sees itself as the self-proclaimed conscience and soul of the administration. In disputes between HUD and OMB, the White House counsel or others in the White House breaks the tie."

On the White House

"It is important to have good relations with the White House. You want them to understand your mission, the good things you're producing for the president and the country. You want to open the doors and windows, explain your story, your goals, the change you want to bring—you have to do this all the time*. The moment you get sick of explaining it is the moment the person you're explaining it to is beginning to get it—you have to keep doing it. The best policy has to be.… explained over and over again."*

— Everett Ehrlich, former Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of Commerce

"I figured the best way to help the president was to do a good job. The problem is that I have not been seen as part of the network or a team player.… I didn't accept White House personnel suggestions. I understand now that appointees have to be more politically sensitive than I was.…"

— George H. W. Bush appointee

On OMB

"OMB has constrained our ability to be flexible. They are the embodiment of the control and accountability values in the bureaucracy. There are people there, both career and political, who are friendly to reinventing government concepts, but overall OMB has a gatekeeper mentality.… OMB will lay out flexible, innovative concepts, recruit candidates (agencies), get them on board, fine-tune it, and then remove the flexibility and keep the restrictions.…The budget people are the blockers, the career people generally. They have a gatekeeper mentality; they love to play the gotcha game. OPM for the most part is a huge obstacle, but there is a little cadre of supportive people there."

— Bill Clinton appointee

"In relation to OMB, mostly what I do is deal with conflict. OMB is very rigid and difficult to deal with, but that's their role and function and they do a good job at it. The department and OMB pre-screen my testimony before Congress and change it if they don't like it. Dancing to the tune of the political arena is all part of the bureaucracy."

— George H. W. Bush appointee

The Satisfaction of Public Service

Survey results indicate appointees' enjoyment of and satisfaction with their tenure in government and public service. They enjoyed dealing with challenging and interesting issues (98 percent reporting feeling generally and very greatly satisfied), making a difference and having an impact (95 percent), and meeting and working with stimulating people (94 percent). They liked working with both the career SES (88 percent) and their political colleagues (83 percent).

They also enjoyed managing in government (87 percent), especially the opportunity to improve agency operations (86 percent). They appreciated opportunities to promote the president's policy objectives (81 percent). They were generally happy with the quality of life in their agencies (68 percent), with the time requirements of their job (62 percent), and the amount of "down" time available to think creatively about the issues with which they deal (57 percent). They were satisfied with their relations with the White House (63 percent) and the news media (61 percent).

4. Collaborate with Congress

A federal bureaucracy that is lodged in the executive branch but overseen in the legislative is inherently cumbersome. Turf and political battles go with the bureaucratic territory, but if government is divided, as it has been for much of the past several decades, the partisan warfare can leave both career and political federal employees feeling like the proverbial grass trampled between two fighting elephants (or donkeys, as the case may be). As the African saying goes: "When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers."

Our numbers reveal that in terms of dealing with the Congress, only 34 percent of the appointees considered it generally or very easy, while 37 percent considered it generally or very difficult. Additional research shows that only 57 percent declared themselves satisfied with their dealings with Congress, while 24 percent were generally or very dissatisfied.

A George H. W. Bush appointee notes, "There is a lack of clear direction of congressional oversight from the committees. The oversight hearings are muddled. You never know what to expect from them, but usually someone's going to get bloodied for political splash."

Oddly paired with lack of direction, he noted, "There is always micromanagement from the legislative branch. GAO is under the gun to produce this also. The fault-finding and micromanagement wear you down. Taking a chance and the risk of producing a mistake are not tolerated. You take constant berating and battering, and there's not much you can do about it—you don't have the leverage to make reform in the federal government. There's a lot of second guessing." The zero-defects-and-intolerance-for-error atmosphere of Washington combines infelicitously with the natural executive/legislative tension, but in this appointee's opinion, it was more an issue of turf than party.

On the other hand, Frank Hodsoll, former deputy director for management at the Office of Management and Budget and former chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts, observed, "You need at least some cooperation with Congress to get anything done." However, Michael J. Astrue, former general counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services, voiced the common feeling that "Congress has way overdone document requests. It simply demands too much documentation from the agencies, unnecessarily taking up far too much of our time and resources."

Inspectors general (IGs) walk a fine line between their assignment to weed out waste, fraud, and abuse, and the desire of many to use their critique to be helpful to their agencies, and the Congress, always looking for an excuse to beat up on an agency. Said one IG, "I haven't had the 'junkyard dog gotcha mentality' in my office. I set up a separate office of inspection and evaluation to tell the assistant secretaries how to correct problems they find. Program managers can ask for help from the unit, the unit gathers data, identifies problems and helps them evaluate how to fix problems. The problem is that the Congress has a 'gotcha' mentality and uses any report I issue that is critical of an agency to attack the agency and try to cut its budget."

Martin Kamarck, former Chair, Export-Import Bank of the United States, said, "Most senators know little about the issues and just want to beat up on an agency head because that's one of the perks of being a senator.... I didn't know the power of a member's staff to block my even getting an appointment with their boss if they wanted to and I didn't have the prior relationship to call the member directly and get through."

Not all appointees feel overwhelmed by the demands and hostility of the Congress. During his time in the executive branch, Anthony McCann, former Assistant Secretary for Management and Budget, Department of Veterans Affairs, recounted, "My relations with Congress were virtually nonexistent. The Hill doesn't understand much of what I do, so they left me alone. The VA has a culture of congressional staff dealing directly with the agency career budget director, so I rarely testified. The positive side of being left alone is that it kept me out of the line of fire when we do stupid things, and we did some stupid things. On the other hand, it has a negative side in that I have no mass of my own. My mass is entirely the secretary's. I can't act alone on a policy issue."

For a more detailed discussion on working with Congress, see "Working with the Congress" in Part II.

"…It is important to remember that members of Congress, even of your party, are only loosely part of the same team. And the reason is that they are part of a separate branch of government that takes its role as a separate branch of government very seriously."

(From Trattner, p. 27)

— Anonymous

"Article I of the Constitution is the Congress. It is not the executive branch, it is not the judicial branch, it is the Congress. The founding fathers felt that was the seminal force for democracy—where the people had the direct authority to influence their lives in a pluralistic system…. everything emanates from that source of power." (From Trattner, p. 264)

— Anonymous

"Congress is on a constant fishing expedition, demanding reams and reams of irrelevant information, demanding to have it yesterday at the latest, lots of oversight hearings. Congress is a pain in the neck, it's always overdoing oversight. They demand too much information and then they still hand out misinformation."

— Bill Clinton appointee

"All legislative powers are vested in Congress. Not most, not some, not domestic, but all legislative power is vested in Congress, and members of Congress take that seriously. Congress is much more ideological than the public generally is, and much more ideological than most members of the executive branch. Members of Congress are political…. The role of Congress is to be the forum in which differing points of view are debated, thought out, and one or the other prevails." (From Trattner, p. 11)

— Former member of the House

"Congress likes to hold hearings to yell about things. Congressmen are petty tyrants running a circus—hearings are shows to get headlines, publicity. They often display a willful ignorance of economics—hearings are grandstanding without knowing/learning the details. We waste money, time, and effort responding endlessly to congressional oversight rather than pursuing our mission."

— George H. W. Bush appointee

"I should have spent more time cultivating relationships with Congress. My attitude when I came in was 'I don't do Congress,' which was okay with my predecessor, who did it. However, when it hit the fan and my agency was under attack in Congress, I didn't have any backup. I hadn't built up trust ahead of time."

— Martin Kamarck

"Personally, I have great relations with the staff on the Hill. The key to being able to work in these jobs is respect for people and the job and roles that they have."

— Martha Krebs

"I know how the place works, I stick close to the committee and staff and keep them well informed. It makes them feel like proud parents, gives them ownership. Because I have made them crucial partners, I have good relationships with key staffers who are overlooked by White House staffers without Hill experience. They view Hill staffers as second-class citizens and only want to deal with the principal. But political appointees should realize that the staffers are the extension of power and authority of the member, they pass credit on to the Hill."

— Bill Clinton appointee with previous Hill experience

"Initiate contact with them. Say, 'I'm working on these topics and I know they are of concern to you, your district, your committee, you personally.… Ultimately, they need information from you about the topics that you deal with, so why not make it an open-ended offer to begin with?"

(From Trattner, p. 32)

— Former member of Congress

5. Think Media

In a town in which the media is ever present, it can be surprising for appointees to learn the amount of effort required to get their story out to the public. The media can be your best ally in promoting your issue, but they can also be your worst enemy when something goes amiss. By consistently helping the media best do their job—by being available, by being forthright—you will benefit the most in both good times and bad. Still, it's always an uneasy alliance.

Appointees expressed a certain ambivalence about the media. Some 42 percent found dealing with it generally or very difficult, though 61 percent said they found their contact with the media satisfying. But as one George H. W. Bush IG said, "I have no or low respect for the media. I don't trust them. They are very interested in my reports but only as headline-grabbers ('Scandal at Agency X!')." Ivan Selin, former chair of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, was something of an exception. He noted, "The media are the avenues to the people. Every public servant should consider it part of the job to deal with the media. It's the prime way to deal with their employers (the public). I have more sympathy for the media and Congress than do most appointees."

Susan M. Phillips, former governor of the Federal Reserve System, found a way to deal with the frustrations of dealing with "the fishbowl atmosphere in which you have to be careful about what you say, versus the university environment where freedom of speech is assumed, especially since the economy and market forces are so sensitive." After a bad experience with the media, Phillips says, "My frustration about being misinterpreted by a reporter and the subsequent effect on the stock market led me to cut way back on access to the press. But that isn't necessarily a healthy thing; you need to maintain a healthy balance. I use a text now when I give speeches and I give it to reporters so they can get it right. My talks are on futures or derivatives and are highly technical, so the press doesn't know as much about the subject and so rely on my text. They actually appreciate the help. It is more work but it's a good protection, and as a result, I have had fewer press problems than my peers who haven't learned that technique."

For a more detailed discussion of working with the media, see "Working with the Media" in Part II.

"The news cycle today is constant.... So there is terrible tension between getting the story right and getting it right away. You need to do both, but it's more important to get it right.... You've got to have your credibility. It's the most important thing, it's why you were brought into this government...."

(From Trattner, p. 43)

— Anonymous

"You've got to understand that almost nobody in Washington is paying attention to your issue, regardless of how essential it is. You've got to break through the background clutter. You have to educate the media about your agency and its objectives. As a starter, better you invest an hour educating a reporter than try to get a story out."

(From Trattner, p. 11)

— Former agency head

"Bad news is not like wine or cheese—it does not improve with age. You have a choice. Do you want to have a one-day story that says you screwed up? Or a three- or four-day story that says you screwed up and lied about how you screwed up and you tried to make it go away and it didn't go away? Better to just get it over with."

(From Trattner, p. 39)

— Anonymous

"If there's a difference between government and private industry, it is in the ability to tell one's story. In government there is a sense that if you put out a press release once, it's enough. There isn't necessarily a sense of reinforcing it, of going back. There are great stories to be told."

(From Trattner, p. 50)

— Anonymous

6. Pace Yourself

Washington is, in many ways, a tough town. It is difficult, particularly for people who come from outside the area, to find comfortable pockets of friendship, safe harbors to let off steam, or places simply to talk about something other than politics. There certainly is an awareness of the importance of dealing appropriately with stress. As William O. Studeman, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, noted, "Managing your health is a big issue around town. You have to avoid getting emotionally tied to it and develop stress management techniques, or this town will run you over and kill you deader than a doornail."

"I always feel stressed" is, unfortunately, a common feeling among appointees. As Admiral William Crowe, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom, observed, "Only in America are you presumed innocent until you're appointed by the president to a political position." As a new appointee, you will need to find ways to manage the stress you encounter.

"People in Washington tend to go to extremes about exercise," commented Martin Kamarck. "Either they are fanatics or they do nothing. There's lots to do in Washington but no real social life. Everything is politics; you have to watch yourself at all times, lest you let something slip out in an unguarded moment or behavior."

Another Bill Clinton appointee concurred: "You miss important family events, particularly when you're on the road. There are tensions between you and your spouse over your absences. It's really hard when I feel I am trying to do a good job, which entails travel, but I get the resentment at home, which, I must admit, I resent."

"The stress level is high," Studeman acknowledged. "You're used to doing it if you're already in town, but outsiders coming into town to take a political position might have a harder time adjusting to stress. You have to pick and choose priorities. There's also the social demands. My wife is an unpaid worker for the government."

With 60, 70, or even 80-hour weeks not uncommon, political government work is emotionally, physically, and intellectually draining. One Bill Clinton appointee attributed her high stress level to "the avalanche of things that have to be done: paper, meetings, different balls in the air, taking work home every night and weekend. The hours are intense—you don't know when the pressure's building up and the next thing you know, you've got a humongous cold or the flu. It's hard to feel like you can get away from it and totally relax. I work approximately 80 hours a week. I expected more of a slowdown after the letdown of the election win, but there has actually been more activity."

One George H. W. Bush appointee said that his stress level has been *very* high from day one. "The goal of most appointees by the end of the job is to leave one's job and get out of town with as few scars as possible. My job was listed as one of the 100 toughest jobs in government. With no annual leave or sick leave, you can't be out of touch, and if you are, you're in trouble. The IG watches you like a hound and has to investigate even anonymous allegations, no matter how far-fetched."

Roland Vautour agreed that there is a "very high level of stress among PASs. It comes from interest group pressure, Congress, self-imposed stress, stress coming from attempts to change things, when the status quo is the overriding influence in this town."

Philip Lee, former Assistant Secretary for Health in the Department of Health and Human Services, agreed with Vautour's assessment. "The hardest things to deal with are the growth and influence of the interest groups. I had been in health care policy for 30 years, but until now I didn't appreciate the magnitude of the interest group politics. I would have spent more time working with them before going forward with policy, I would have spent time hearing from them early on. The other major feature is the partisan polarization and political ideological hardening of positions, rather than problem solving."

One Bill Clinton appointee concurred with the conventional wisdom about the increasing political nastiness of Washington: "In 1994 when I came back, I found a more partisan, bitter, and petty town than when I left in 1981."

Everett Ehrlich also commented on the need to work the politics outside his agency: "I spent too much time doing internal management. I didn't realize how much you could use the constituency to mobilize support. The constituency of data users should be mobilized to support the programs they depend on. I needed earlier to develop a greater taste for going to lunch, put in the time and effort to nurture a network around town."

Table 5: How Easy or Difficult Do You Find Your Job?

Aspects of the Job	Generally and Very Easy	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Generally and Very Difficult
Managing a government organization or agency	30%	23%	47%
The substantive details of the policies with which I deal	38%	22%	40%
Decision making procedures of agency or department	31%	28%	41%
Directing senior career employees	63%	24%	13%
Defending my budget	39%	25%	37%
Defending my programs	48%	24%	28%
Dealing with the White House	47%	34%	19%
Dealing with OMB	35%	37%	28%
Dealing with Congress	34%	30%	37%
Dealing with the news media	42%	38%	20%

Rare though they are, there are those appointees who claim to have their stress under control. William Albrecht, former commissioner of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, says he doesn't let stress get to him and is able to keep a sense of humor about it. "This is the least stress I've operated under. Deaning at a university was more stressful. I have no administrative duties here."

An overview of specific aspects of political appointees' jobs, shown in Table 5, reveals varying levels of stress and frustration, including aspects highlighted in this report.

"Stress is a problem of the professional generation, but there are more workaholics in Washington than in any other place. They don't take time for families, so family problems arise. Health problems arise from not eating well and not exercising. It's the fast-track mentality—everyone's pretty much in a hurry. We'd do better jobs if we went a bit slower."

— Paul Igaski, former Vice Chairman,
Equal Opportunity Employment Commission

"I work 50 to 55 hours a week, but I don't have a hectic day. I have time to think about what I want to do. I delegate a great deal to the deputy assistant secretaries, unlike those who get swamped in minutiae and do not let it go. They deal with too much themselves."

— Anthony McCann

"I exercise and try to eat more reasonably; it's hard to do with all the dinners out. My divorce was largely caused by and added to the stress. We had to have a long-distance relationship and the marriage fell apart. It's impossible to have much time together; you don't solve problems if you don't have time together. You don't have a life, you don't have people in for dinner in Washington—you go out to restaurants."

— Bill Clinton appointee

"Your energy is the first thing government strips. It doesn't actually use your intellect—there's too much to do, too much to read, too much preparation required to make good use of one's intellect. Often I read material on the way to a meeting at which I have to make major financial decisions ... too much is decided on too little information. There is a lack of quality time to spend really thinking about the job."

— George H. W. Bush appointee

"The stresses ... are ... fatiguing. There are many more influences/ramifications due to interconnections with other government agencies. Now it's a mental and diplomatic exercise more than anything else. I cannot make a decision without doing it in a committee—it's not just based on objective factors, the best available information."

— George H. W. Bush appointee

"You have to live this, there's no way to know it otherwise. I didn't anticipate the level of stress. I've had stress before, but this is Olympic stress. What's most frustrating is not having a clear shot at making a decision, no authority to make a final decision—hundreds of people have the power to block any decision."

— George H. W. Bush appointee

7. Enjoy the Job

Despite the frustrations inherent in government service, appointees find many satisfactions in it. Ginger Lew values, "Being able to implement policies that make a real difference in peoples' lives, such as our microlending programs. For example, there was a woman who was in a shelter, a victim of domestic violence. We gave her a loan so she could start a small business selling lapel pins. She now has $1 million in annual sales and employs 20 women who were all victims of domestic violence. This is good stuff, there are great success stories to share."

The chance to work in a particular area of expertise with colleagues one respects attracts many. Reflecting on her time at the Department of Interior, Bonnie Cohen said, "It was an opportunity to make a difference in an area (the environment) that I think is a critical area." Doyle Cook, former board member, Farm Credit Administration, noted the satisfaction of "being able to put into practice what I've learned over the years, developing policies, fixing situations." For Nicolas P. Retsinas, former assistant secretary for housing at the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the satisfaction came from "the opportunity to be at the table for every housing issue facing the country."

Anthony McCann found his "greatest sources of satisfaction are relations with the staff and redemption of lost souls (careerists who have been sidelined or shunted aside). Once placed in different positions where their skills match the job, where they are given something meaningful to do where their skills are best used, they have flourished."

One George H. W. Bush appointee enjoyed being an agent for change in his job. He was able to use his negotiation skills from his prior work at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and found satisfaction in reaching compromise to problem solve. He even enjoyed political work and working with Congress. Another spoke of the challenge of the job itself as reason enough, despite a large loss he sustained in retired military pay.

A George H. W. Bush appointee noted: "It's an honor to serve the president, an opportunity to operate at a senior executive level I mightn't have had otherwise. It's not a second career, it's a presidential appointment for a finite duration." Said William Albrecht, "It's a great experience. However, the opportunity to feel you've done something is less than it is in academia where one can build up a program or develop a school. You have to create those opportunities to do something." Frank Hodsoll said he simply enjoyed "getting things done. It's a lot less money but a lot more fun than if I'd stayed in the law firm." Another George H. W. Bush appointee said, "It's the most exciting job I've ever had in my life—there's never been a boring moment."

"Has it been a good experience? I don't know. Am I glad I did it? Yes," said Ada Deer, former Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs at the Department of Interior. Remarked Edward Gleiman, former chairman of the Postal Rate Commission, "Would I do it again? You bet, it's been frustrating but fun."

"One's personal life is so compromised, there's not enough time to see friends—it's crazy, totally insane. Protect some of that time more, don't respond to every request. Delegate or turn down requests—it's hard for a new person to do, but it's absolutely essential."

— Philip Lee

"Washington is a very demanding, expensive town. The in-crowd social expectations could easily dominate your entire life."

— George H. W. Bush appointee

"I get a real sense of satisfaction from suggesting change and having it implemented. It's like golf—you get one or two good shots a round and you keep coming back."

— Charles Baquet

"You're far more involved in critical issues than if you work in the private sector."

— Anthony McCann

"I feel the loss of ambition and money are offset by the challenge the work provides, the ability to have a positive impact, the opportunity to make a difference. There is no similar opportunity outside of government."

— Pamela Talkin, former member, Federal Labor Relations Authority

"Being a PAS opened a world to me that I didn't know existed—it was an adventure and important on substantive grounds, as well."

— Sharon Robinson, former Assistant Secretary, Office of Education Research and Improvement, Department of Education

Part II

Essays on Working in Washington

Working with the Congress

By John H. Trattner, Council for Excellence in Government
(Adapted from *The 2000 Prune Book: How to Succeed in Washington's Top Jobs*)

(The italicized quotes below are drawn from interviews of presidential appointees for **The Prune Book** *and from panelists who took part in orientation conferences for new appointees conducted by The Council and the White House from 1997 to 1999.)*

If you're a presidential appointee who deals regularly with the Congress, you may already recognize some of the striking contrasts, obvious and not so obvious, between the Hill and your own branch of government.

Unlike the executive branch, with defined, stated objectives set by its political leadership, the Congress is an arena where two parties push legislative agendas that are often in direct, open conflict. Further, a political party running the executive branch normally has no problem controlling it or getting its various elements to pull in the same general direction. In the Congress, however, neither party—whether in the majority or minority—can always count on such order within its ranks. A majority's ability to control the decision on a given bill may only be nominal.

The congressional operating schedule offers another useful comparison. Increasingly hostage to the demands of fund-raising and fence mending, the Congress's work on substance is nowhere near as orderly, nor its progress as straight-line, as that of the executive branch. Its irregular pace and rhythm, its fractionated processes, can skew the timing and legislative hopes of any administration.

The Congress is now basically a Tuesday-to-Thursday club. What you have is a lot of members of the House and Senate who come in Tuesday morning, leave Thursday night, and are not here a lot.

Over time, such factors have widened the inherent differences in approach and attitude between the two branches. That makes it harder for people in either place to understand, and allow for, the work habits, tactics, strategy, and outlook typical of the other. It's true as much for relationships between career staffs as between executive branch appointees and members of Congress. How well you can manage across these divides has a lot to do with the impact you can make in your job—how far you can go toward your objectives.

A Few Critical Generalities

You shouldn't plunge into the congressional dimension of your job without some overall appreciation of the Congress as probably the strongest, certainly the most contentious, power center in a city with several of them. A sense of this emerges from several comments by veteran observers, first about the job of the Congress:

The framers really had in mind making Congress a formidable power, the first branch of government, giving it powers to legislate, appropriate, investigate; giving them their own single constituencies to pay attention to; terms of office distinct from the president; a bicam-

eral legislature that ensures substantial conflict between the House and the Senate—a natural tension that develops between politicians' need to represent their constituents and to engage in serious deliberation and policy making. It's a body remarkable for its division of labor and specialization and the importance of congressional staff. Remember the framers had in mind to make it a complex, personal, explicitly political process.

The source of its prerogative:
Article I of the Constitution is the Congress. It is not the executive branch, it is not the judicial branch, it is the Congress. The founding fathers felt that was the seminal force for democracy—where the people had the direct authority to influence their lives in a pluralistic system. The fact is, regardless of what we think about individual members, everything emanates from that source of power.

Its personality:
People from Will Rogers on have tried to diagnose and explain Congress. Some see it as an august deliberative body. One woman member of the House of Representatives referred to it as an unruly day-care center. Let me suggest another option: It suffers from attention deficit disorder.

The way it operates:
Simple majorities don't matter anymore. You either have unanimous consent to get something done, or you need a committed super majority of 60 or more. That puts a big burden on anybody doing business from the White House or from the agencies—the burden either to build unanimous consent for your issue or to activate a very committed super majority. The power the Constitution gives to the minority is still very evident. There are continued attempts to take away that power, but it's still a very important one in that it protects the minority.

Its members' sense of independence within their own parties:
People in the executive branch make the mistake, in terms of what they expect of the Congress, to assume that members of their own party there are supposed to carry out the president's will. Supposed to be the floor leaders for the president, supposed to be the point men and women for the president's programs. It is important to remember that members of Congress, even of your party, are only loosely part of the same team. And the reason is that they are part of a separate branch of government that takes its role as a separate branch of government very seriously.

Nor can you expect to work well with the Hill without mastering at least a few other fundamentals. It helps to know something about the House and Senate rules and about parliamentary procedures. It's almost mandatory to be familiar with structure and function—especially in the design and funding of executive branch programs.

On that front, a senior White House staffer with congressional experience recommends that appointees "know the difference between the appropriations and authorization committees." That may sound pretty elementary. But "those are different processes on the Hill that people sometimes don't distinguish from each other."

Decisions on Money and Programs

So let's look at that for a minute. According to House and Senate rules, here's basically how the Congress is supposed to provide money for government programs. The power to authorize funds belongs to legislative committees that have jurisdiction over the various areas of government responsibility—health, labor, science, defense, and so on—and over executive branch agencies and programs in those areas. They are the authorizing committees. The power actually to make the money available resides with the appropriations committees and their various subcommittees. As they move toward these decisions, committees conduct hearings where executive branch agency leaders or senior political managers make their case for the new or existing programs and money requests laid out in the president's annual budget message to the Congress.

Each year, the Congress divides its funding task into 13 regular money bills that cover all government agencies and functions (plus the District of Columbia). The rules prescribe an annual two-step procedure. In step one, an authorizing committee enacts a measure that can create, continue, or modify a program (or an agency) for a set or indefinite amount of time and approve the appropriation of money for it. The measure may specify the duties and functions of the program, its structure, and the responsibilities of the executive branch officials involved.

In step two, the appropriations committees, after getting the recommendations of their 13 subcommittees, allocate funds to the programs that have been authorized. These decisions then come to the floor of each house for approval. Differences between House and Senate versions of these decisions go to joint conference committees for resolution; the results of that go back to each floor for approval. Once that is in hand—and the president signs the measure—the programs or agencies affected finally have budget authority to incur obligations and spend the money. If unanticipated needs arise within a program during the fiscal year, the Congress can and often does provide supplemental funding in a separate measure.

Keep firmly in mind that there are two kinds of spending for federal programs—discretionary and direct. Generally, discretionary funding takes the two-step route outlined above. But direct spending is funded by the authorizing process alone and today accounts for about two-thirds of all outlays. Most direct spending goes into entitlement programs where the level of funding is already fixed by previously enacted law. Social Security, for example, gets its funding through permanent appropriations in the program's authorizing law. Other direct spending, like that for Medicaid, is an "appropriated entitlement"; it is funded each year by the appropriations committees, but the authorizing legislation controls the amount.

Those are the rules. How do they work in practice? As individual appropriations, the 13 money bills are supposed to go through the painstaking process outlined above and be adopted by October 1, the beginning of the fiscal year in which they apply. These years, it rarely happens. The reality is that only a handful of bills might get through on time. The Congress, with the deadline looming, hastily wraps the rest into one large "omnibus" bill for quick passage, which critics say is also largely unexamined passage. For any bills that still don't make it, legislators must enact what is called a continuing resolution. This makes stop-gap funding available for the affected agencies and programs until the appropriations can be made. (Sometimes agencies have gone through an entire fiscal year on continuing resolutions.) In cases of extensive deadlock, where agreement on most appropriations is still absent at the October 1 mark, the Congress has been known simply to stop the clock, postponing the deadline for a few days.

Appropriators Vs. Authorizers

Further, many observers believe the whip hand in making funding decisions for executive branch agencies increasingly belongs to the appropriators.

There are three political parties in Washington: the Republicans, the Democrats and the appropriators. And the appropriators operate at a different beat from everybody else.

"My own experience," says a political consultant with a lot of it, "is that the appropriations committees are quickly becoming the only committees in the sense that more and more stuff is getting done at the last minute." That refers to the habit in both Houses over the last decade or more to put off most individual funding for agencies or groups of agencies during a legislative session, then fold them all into monster "omnibus" bills enacted in the last few days. As this individual points out, "the number of what would ordinarily be called authorizing pieces of legislation that are rolled into the omnibus bills is quite long."

"The authorizers do have a lot of impact on appropriations committee language," adds a former congressman. "They are by no means irrelevant to the process. But if you look over the last several decades, you've seen a very sharp decline in the power of the authorizing committees and a very sharp increase in the power of the appropriations committees." It's understandable, he says, that the executive branch might think it is wasting time dealing with authorizing committees and decide "just to focus on the appropriations committee, where the decision is probably going to be made that will really count." He notes the development of a new science—drafting language that is really authorizing language to put into an appropriations bill.

Why is this happening? It shouldn't, according to the House and Senate rules that enforce the separation of the authorization and appropriations processes. Among other transgressions, they forbid the inclusion of legislative language in appropriations bills. Yet to enforce these provisions, it's necessary to raise a point of order—formally invoke the rules. And the rules can also be waived by suspending them.

"If I had a scale of whom you should pay attention to, I would clearly start with the appropriators," is the realistic advice of another onetime member of the House. "If you're going to spend time and effort getting to know people, it's those in the appropriations process. You try to build a leadership program that involves the White House, that is bipartisan, that involves the appropriators, that plays off the authorizers. Usually, lesson number one, the appropriators are going to win. So take that to the bank, regardless of the issue." Or, as a former congressional staffer puts it: *When there's a fight between the appropriators and the authorizers, stick with the appropriators. They get a shot at you every single year.*

Don't let this advice unbalance your approach too much, however. The same people who offer it also warn against neglecting the authorizing committees. This is where the day-to-day oversight of what you do resides. Authorizing committees are "your champions," says one, "who have invested a lot in your bureaucracy. Don't ignore them." Make certain you don't "mess around with your authorizing committee," says another, since they "can make your life miserable. Don't work on your appropriators without letting the people you really work with, the subcommittee chairs, the ranking members, know what you're doing and why you're doing it. Don't think the appropriators are where the only action is and you can forget these other guys."

Legislators and Their Constituencies

Another factor not to overlook is the relationship between members of Congress and the people they represent. They are not just those whose votes sent the member to Congress last time around. They are individuals and groups with businesses, economic interests, issues, causes, and special situations the member is expected to look out for. Some of them may not necessarily be confined to the member's home district or state. Together, all these constituencies come first in every member's daily thoughts—not least because they matter decisively in an objective that preoccupies every member: re-election. "People who deal with Congress deal in peril if they don't recognize the incredible interconnection that members of Congress have with their constituents," observes a former member. "It tends to be the way they learn about a lot of what they know. They learn by anecdote, by the individual case of what went wrong in a business, what went wrong for an individual, what went right at the Social Security Administration." A former colleague from the other side of the aisle agrees: "The most significant driving force for any member of the House or Senate is his or her origins—the district or the state."

Recognizing the many differences between House and Senate, smart political appointees will tailor their approaches accordingly. House members are "better prepared," but "more provincial," according to a veteran of service in that chamber. Senators are less prepared, which means their personal and committee staffers swing greater weight. "But senators have a broader view. You may have a quicker, more positive decision on your behalf with a member of the Senate because of the more reflective nature of that body." Depending on where they are in the election cycle, senators also have far more time to deal with the issues. A good rule of thumb is to think of House and Senate as almost separate entities, while never considering one more important than the other.

Relationships

"If you keep the Congress involved, there are no surprises," says an agency head. "They may not always like what you do, but at least they're not surprised. They don't read it in the paper and think, gee, I didn't know anything about that." A senior white House official makes the same point: "They feel worse about reading it in the paper than if you call and tell them that they can't get what they want. No surprises."

If you're trying to develop or strengthen relationships on the Hill, she suggests finding ways for members of the Congress "to share the credit for what you're doing." For example, invite them to events, to tour facilities, to visit programs. If you're having a press conference about something they are concerned with, ask them to join you. In other words, "give them some ownership of the issues, bring them into the process." Be sure in this that you are being bipartisan about it. Don't limit it to just members of your own party. And "look to the members of your committee and then members beyond that. Get them to help you with their expertise."

A lawyer and lobbyist who also served in the Congress recommends being proactive. *Initiate contact with them. Say "I'm working on these topics and I know they are of concern to you, your district, your committee, you personally." Say you've got scientists or engineers, social workers or nurses or doctors, whatever it is, you have people that can answer some of their questions on those subjects and they should put you down as a resource. Ultimately they need information from you about the topics* *that you deal with, so why not make it an open-ended offer to begin with? It's much better to offer the help than have somebody serve a Freedom of Information Act subpoena on you.*

You can also make the same offer to staff people who work on given issues for members or committees. Do the same thing with chairs and ranking members of committees. This can have a variety of payoffs. For instance:

It could be in the waning days of one of these omnibus bills that you get a phone call and your input makes the difference in somebody being stuck or willing to bend a little bit. In the final hours of congressional sessions, bending a little bit is what it's all about.

"That doesn't mean you have to co-opt the policy of your department," says this same experienced Hill observer. "It doesn't mean that you have to turn your policy inside out. In a great many instances, it means having information available in which to make a reasoned choice. You have the key to much of the information." If you don't choose to give that key to decision makers in the Congress to use now and then, they may see you as "hiding something or unwilling to help—and that's not good for anybody."

Recently, when a big agency published certain information as required by law, it put some people on the Hill into a serious snit. Here's what happened, related by the head of the agency:

When we first implemented that by the date required, there was a huge uproar about the way we were doing it. Some on the committees were very upset. We went over and said, "Look, we know, we see, we hear, this is not the way it should be, let's work and try to figure out how we can fix this." If we had responded very defensively, and taken sort of an arm's-length approach, I think we would have been in some kind of a war. But that wasn't our point of view. We were not trying to make this thing work badly, we just didn't quite figure it out right. So we said, "Come in and help us." And they did, and we've made it better. So I think the approach is not to be defensive when things go wrong, and to solicit help from all quarters. When you can't accommodate somebody's specific desire, be very up front about why that is. By and large, that has worked pretty well so far.

Oversight

Very few high-level administration appointees in the last 50 years have not felt the thrust (some would call it the sting) of congressional oversight. A less polite term, one you'll encounter frequently, is micromanagement. Oversight means the Congress' responsibility to supervise federal agencies in their program and budget management, their progress toward stated goals, their problems and prospects, and much else. In the process, legislators are supposed to gather information to assist its decisions on designing and paying for government's efforts to run the country's public business. Onerous though it can be, federal agency political managers must learn to work in businesslike fashion with congressional exercise of the oversight function.

The oversight role normally resides in the congressional authorizing committees. It can take the form of committee hearings, field trips, official requests for information, informal inquiries, simple phone calls, and a variety of other mechanisms. Legislators quite naturally use the opportunity for related purposes—to speak for their constituents, promote a point of view, commend or criticize, uphold or undermine. Oversight is a necessary but imperfect function that depends for effectiveness on the willingness of the executive branch and the Congress to work together. Here's how a past House member views it:

There can be too much oversight, without any doubt—too much demand for information and documentation that is not looked at. But a lot of this demand arises from frustration. A member will ask an executive branch official to do this or that. The official says, "yes, that's absolutely right, Congressman, I agree with you wholeheartedly," and walks out the door and nothing ever happens. This gets very frustrating, and members feel the executive branch is not paying any attention, not consulting, not taking them seriously.

The inevitable result?

The only way to get the attention of the executive branch is (something incisive like) dropping in an amendment they don't like. In their view, that's micromanaging, and it probably is. It arises out of a frustration over the lack of serious dialogue between the two branches and the feeling that the executive branch often looks upon the Congress as an obstacle to be overcome, not as a partner in the process. If you have that frame of mind, you're in deep trouble with the Congress.

On the level of personal attitude and behavior on the Hill, a former congressman cautions executive branch managers not to "get personal at any time with arguments or issues." That watchword advice is one of the fundamental truths about the Congress—universally recognized and applicable as much to relationships between members themselves as between members and administration officials:

Remember that today's adversary may be tomorrow's ally.

And some related advice:
Don't be put off by an initial hostile attitude. Sometimes it seems hostile on the surface, but dealing with Congress and the staff is a very personal thing. Call up the staff person of the member that appears hostile and try to have a meeting. You're sure not going to get anywhere if you don't try to have the meeting.

One of the former congressmen quoted earlier takes this further. "Don't grovel," he says. "State your case, but don't be submissive or appear to be weak. Don't be in a situation where members think you're their vassal." Members are interested in you, just as you are in them, and for the same reason: because you can do something for them. "You're part of a legislative process that's important to them. Don't feel that you're the supplicant in the relationship."

The final word on personal behavior is the old maxim, a cliché but a useful one, quoted by an agency assistant secretary, suggesting that one can "catch more flies with honey than vinegar."

Getting Things Done

Whatever your objective with the Congress, immediate or longer term, achieving it will require a variety of strategies, tactics, or combinations of each. On this question, the best take comes from people who have been the targets of these various approaches while serving in the House and Senate.

One direct approach is lobbying—personal contact with members to enlist their support of a program, a funding request, or other desired action. Depending on what you're seeking, this can be a tough, often frustrating, mission. Yet a former congressman of long service thinks the executive branch puts too few resources into it. "An administration cannot do an effective job if it only trusts three or four people to come to the Hill and lobby, or starts too late," he says. He views the 1999 failure to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty as a "classic example" of that. "You've got to start early and you've got to stay with it. You have to be flexible according to the members' level of understanding of the issue. You have to consult very broadly, not just with a few." In his experience, the executive branch often makes the "big-time" mistake of confining its lobbying to members of the committee with jurisdiction over the issue.

Naturally, executive branch lobbying has to fight for congressional time and attention with legions of lobbyists for commercial and other nongovernment interest groups ranged along a very long spectrum. These people are specialists in what they do, devote full time to it, and can call on experience, resources, and techniques not available to the executive branch. They are also far better paid. Comparing their objectives on the Hill with those of the executive branch risks distortion or oversimplification; often, it's an apples-and-oranges comparison. But there are times when the interests of both coincide to a point where some form of alliance can be useful.

Among a number of indirect approaches to desired action in the Congress are those endorsed by a cabinet secretary with prior service in the House. "How do you get members' attention? Ask their colleagues to talk to them. That is probably the best way to get their support—a neglected way, but critically important. Next best is editorials in their home state newspapers. Generate those through your public affairs office. That has strong impact. Be careful that it isn't obvious that you're doing it. Third: phone calls rather than written material. Phone calls from live people in interest and stakeholders groups make more of an impact than letters, computer e-mail, telegrams, or faxes."

Also recommended is a continuous process of educating members on your issue or objective.
Go to the power centers outside of your committee, the whips, the Hispanic caucus, black caucus. If it's a children's issue, there are a lot of caucuses that deal with children. Go to members who belong to informal groups that might be responsive to your issue. Be creative, tenacious, and persistent.

Many agencies have congressional liaison offices, sometimes headed by an official at the assistant secretary level. It's their job to shepherd an agency's legislative requests, track the progress of bills through the committee and floor processes, and maintain the agency's relationships on the Hill. They also assist in preparations for testimony by agency officials, spot opportunities to negotiate deals or compromises and do some hand-holding with individual members—committee chairs, ranking members, others with power or influence over the fate of a given issue. "Generally, they're very good," says this agency head about congressional liaison operations. "On the whole, very competent people." However, he cautions, they tend to get too tight with their key congressional contacts, to develop what in other realms might be called clientitis. "Many of them have good instincts," he says, "but if you have to err when taking their advice, be a little bolder than what they recommended."

Another cabinet secretary and onetime congressman says an appointee's job "is to carry out the policy of the president. Not to do it blindly, but with good judgment." Presidents, he observes, don't need "sycophants who just parrot everything without thinking through what will help get the message and the policy through." What they do need is the use of independent judgment and wisdom in working with the Congress. "Don't be afraid to use those qualities in the process as long as you're not working at cross purposes with what the policy objectives are." From that flows a further point: Assets like integrity, insight, and discretion in an executive branch leader earn trust on the Hill and are likely to carry that individual further.

Dealing with Individual Members

From the wealth of comment and counsel tendered by those who have served in the Congress, some common keynotes emerge when it comes to individual legislators and the do's and don'ts of working with them.

Members today, says one of their colleagues, have several roles. They are legislators, politicians, and educators. They are students who must learn quickly. They are advocates for their constituents and communities, dignitaries invited to every function in their state or district, to say nothing of many events in Washington and abroad. They are traveling fact finders. They are deal makers.

And, we can add, never forget they are fundraisers, driven to invest disproportionate time in the effort to be re-elected.

To get the most out of your one-on-one contacts with them while sidestepping the pitfalls, the following points can help:

- Understand members' relevance to your concerns. Are they on the committees that you deal with or particularly involved in your issues? When you're planning to call on a member, explore the political framework of what you are seeking. Is the issue you will discuss a plus or a minus for the member? Is it a problem to be on your side or an easy issue to help you with? How well will it play back in their district?

- For you, the most important person in a member's office is not the chief of staff, the legislative assistant, the appropriations person, or the substantive foreign policy expert. It's the scheduler. A former congressman says, "Things got so busy for me in latter years that I had to schedule an appointment with my scheduler in order to see what I was doing."

- When you visit a member, state right away why you're there. Be succinct, professional, and candid about what is in your interest. Don't ramble. Think about what tough questions might be thrown at you. Leave before your welcome runs out.

- Don't try to make the member an expert on the subject. Make short, direct points that zero in so the member understands what you're talking about. The member's staff person on whatever your issue is will be much more informed. You'll want to talk at length with that individual and perhaps provide some briefing materials (which the member won't read). But some members will know more about the issue than you. So be ready to deal with various members at various levels of comprehension.

- Members won't always object if your response to something they want is really a non-response. This is especially true if a member's request is something absurdly unreal like, "My constituent Dolly Jackson was in Paris for three days and wants to be ambassador to France." Members often try to deal with such problems by bucking them to the executive branch. In this case, if you answer that the lady isn't likely to get the job because she doesn't sound qualified for it, you've taken care of that member's problem.

- Don't assume that because members disagree heatedly in public that there is some antipathy between them. Public differences don't necessarily mean private differences as well. Quite often, members of different parties, or those who are adversaries in public, are good friends privately.

- Don't be afraid to say that what the member said about you or your issue was unfair and you want to explain why. Don't appear to be totally submissive, as if you've been whacked and must make amends. Remember that you're all in a political process, and in the executive branch you are dealing with the Congress on a very professional basis. It helps sometimes to put a little edge on what you need to get done.

Working with the Media

By John H. Trattner, Council for Excellence in Government
(Adapted from *The 2000 Prune Book: How to Succeed in Washington's Top Jobs*)

(The italicized quotes below are drawn from interviews of presidential appointees for **The Prune Book** *and from panelists who took part in orientation conferences for new appointees conducted by The Council and the White House from 1997 to 1999.)*

In today's Washington, good news is usually less interesting to media covering the federal government than bad news. It probably always will be—for all kinds of reasons, people simply pay more attention to bad news and, therefore, so do the media. It's just human nature. Bad news concerning your agency doesn't have to be a hanging offense, however. Yet, afraid of generating bad news, people who run federal agencies sometimes fall into the trap of trying to make no news at all. And there you have the essence of the media challenge for federal leaders.

A federal agency with a good media operation has several things going for it. First, an agency that doesn't wait to be asked—that finds creative ways to attract objective, positive coverage and tells its story honestly and factually—can make and keep a favorable impression among people everywhere. That will boost the agency's ability to perform well across the board. Reporters and editors respect an institution that is accessible and helps them do their jobs. Implicitly or explicitly, that gets reflected in what they report. The results are not lost on that agency's citizen customers, congressional overseers, other government agencies, and the public at large.

Example: When the Defense Department prepared to deploy U.S. troops to peacekeeping duties in Bosnia in 1996, it knew all too well that a lot of public opinion in this country opposed the move. Already skeptical about the need for a U.S. peacekeeping role, Americans also worried about combat casualties in a distant war. To turn the situation around, the Pentagon adopted an assertive, consistent communications strategy on Bosnia that portrayed the troop deployment as a mission to help others help themselves, not to take sides or dictate terms. As part of their assignment, American troops got media training to help them convey that message. Given easy access to American soldiers in Bosnia, journalists reported to American audiences on their life and work there. About a month into the mission, a major opinion poll showed that more than half the American public supported U.S. policy in Bosnia. Later, the American military presence was stretched beyond its original one year—and U.S. troops remain there today. Almost no one has argued, then or since, that they should come home. It was a classic example of how to take your case to the public via the media and win.

Handling Bad News

Second, since bad news is inevitable in the life of any institution, an agency that knows what to do at such times can minimize the impact.

Bad news is not like wine or cheese—it does not improve with age. You have a choice. Do you want to have a one-day story that says you screwed up? Or a three- or four-day story that says you screwed up and lied about how you screwed up and you tried to make it go away and it didn't go away? Better to just get it over with.

"The other day," a television correspondent notes, "the FBI announced the arrest of a veteran employee of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), an auditor who had been skimming thousands of dollars for years from the DEA. The DEA put out a press release saying, here's who the person is, here's what the FBI said he did, here's what we've done to try to fix it. Boom—the story just absolutely vanished like paint thinner. Because they stepped up to the plate and said the guy's a bum and he's out. That's exactly the right way to handle it."

Or take the story of the costly Mars Polar Lander mission in late 1999. It failed when, despite repeated attempts, no contact was ever established with the spacecraft after it was to touch down. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was on the front pages for days, with much of the coverage unfavorable. But the agency kept putting out whatever news and comment it could about the mission. "Every time we learn something about what's happening on Mars or isn't happening, we have told the media as we learn it," a NASA official told a network anchorman at the time. But he wondered whether it was worth it, "since it seems to me we're just going to continue to get the bad news over and over again." He wanted to know how the anchorman saw the situation. "I think NASA took a very candid approach," was the reply. "You handled it the way it should have been handled." Maybe there was no way to put a good face on the story, the anchorman said, "but every step along the way, the audience and I were being informed of what was going on. I think NASA is to be congratulated." He went on to say:

We all have our share of bad news, personal, professional, agency. You get the story out there—in my view, you're going to be a lot better off trying to cut your losses early and getting your case out than you are in delay, delay, delay.

There is a third point here. The assets an agency builds in its proactive mode are often just as useful when it must adopt a reactive stance. A federal agency official tells a story that broke about tainted milk when she was an advisor to a state governor. The milk had been contaminated by bad dairy feed. Reporters were demanding to know immediately when the state was going to pull all milk.

We just invited a group of them in to talk. We told them it was easy to think the big issue was when were we going to pull the milk. But you also had to think through a lot of other things. If you pulled all the milk, what were you going to do with it? You can't just go pour it out, because it seeps into ground water. And what about the years spent getting people to drink milk because of the things in it that are good for them? We said, let's talk through this domino effect and the fact that a lot of careful thinking has to be done. And the reason we were able to say those things, at a time when the national press was really pouring in, was because we had offered proactive briefings, trying to make sure there would be a real dialogue going on when something's happening. They were people that we had built good relationships with. I know that's what helped us through that.

Offense or Defense?

"There are generally two kinds of agencies," says the network television anchorman. "One has an agency head or press chief who, when the press calls, says 'let's see what we can do.' The other is the 'oh, my God, it's the media, now what?' kind. Chances are the first kind of agency is going to get a lot better treatment, because there's going to be more cooperation there. I think it takes a sea change in mentality."

No question—spending less time in a reactive crouch and more on advance planning, effective public communications, and outreach is the best investment for working with the media. We've already seen the value of proactivity. What are the other specific elements of that strategy?

Communicators. A former agency public affairs official who was also a television reporter and anchor says, "Get your communication people in on things early, not when decisions and actions are fully formed." Indeed, government public affairs people have long argued that they should be on hand when policy is taking shape, not after the fact. That allows them to understand what the policy is to be and ask all the tough questions now that the press will ask later. It permits them to see to the vital, often neglected, task of coordinating an agency's public communication with other relevant government institutions. Sometimes their participation can help improve the policy decision itself. Sometimes it will alter the way policy is to be presented publicly. Listen to the advice of a leading national public opinion expert:

In government, you need to spend a lot more time figuring out this is going to be the story, this is how we're going to do it, this is how we're going to use the secretary or the under secretary, this is the position.

So one fundamental of good media strategy is that communications people have to be there on offense and defense. It is promotion and damage control, all wrapped into one. Years ago, a government communicator put this concept into words for all time: Public affairs people want to be there "at the take-offs as well as the landings" (when it will also be their job to pick up the pieces if things don't go well).

This is not a question of policy wonks versus communication people. The question is: What's the mission? If you're going to put together a good program, you've got to think of what all the down sides are. Somebody has to be at the table seeing it from that other perspective.

Technique. Next, agency seniors who deal personally with journalists on an individual basis should have one or two rules of thumb in mind. "Go in with an agenda," says a White House official. "That takes some skill so that you don't simply ignore the question on the table. You need to answer the question asked. But, as quickly as you can in the construct of that question, get to what it is that you want to say." Don't give a journalist total control of the agenda. "If you have something to say, make sure you say it. Don't have to offer the excuse later that, 'Well, she never really asked me about X.' "

An agency assistant secretary who meets fairly often with reporters says he usually starts by speaking on a background basis for a while (meaning that what he says cannot be attributed to him by name or position). That's "just to get a feel for what the reporter is about and what the questions are." He thinks it's important to "get a sense of what role you're being cast in for the interview. You have to figure out where the reporter's coming from, what kind of a story is being written, and then you can decide how you can write your own part. If they're just casting you as the dumb government bureaucrat, chances are you want to avoid saying anything that will confirm the impression." Other specific advice:

- Respond promptly to calls from journalists, giving yourself the chance to add the administration's or your own personal point of view to the story and supply information that expands its scope or meaning.
- When possible, especially on policy issues, work both sides of a newspaper—the editorial board as well as the reporters. "Sometimes an editorial board takes wrong-headed or uninformed positions," a correspondent observes frankly. "They do their thing and they don't usually share it with the reporting staff."
- Use the specialized media, the "trade press," in addition to the mainline media. These publications and television channels can make a big difference on particular issues on which they focus. As one reporter joked, "I'm sure, if you work in the Department of Housing and Urban Development, there's a *Modern Bricks Magazine*. Or *Food Stamp Monthly* if you're at Agriculture."

Quality. The third element of a media operation that works is the quality of what's being said. Journalists are often in a hurry, driven by deadlines and competition. Government leaders don't face those particular kinds of pressures. They have less excuse for being inaccurate in what they convey publicly.

The news cycle today is constant. It's not just the evening paper and the evening news. There is talk radio and the net and the cable channels. So there is terrible tension between getting the story right and getting it right away. You need to do both, but it's more important to get it right. The press puts a higher priority on getting it right away. Their biggest fear is they will be in a lot more trouble for being late than for being wrong. You have to have a higher priority on *getting it right. You've got to have your credibility. It's the most important thing, it's why you were brought into this government, in part, and it's what you need to take out of this government with you when you leave.*

Never lie in speaking with journalists in any official capacity. Sooner or later, but inevitably, you'll be caught and your credibility—assuming there's any left—will never be the same. It's also bad for the people you work with, your agency, and your administration. Be as factual and accurate as possible.

But also remember the story about the witness being sworn in at court who, when asked to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, asked, "Which one do you prefer, judge?" In other words, you don't have to volunteer information that isn't being asked for, but what you do say should be the truth.

Make sure people can understand what you are saying. If a government communication is unintelligible, a university media expert argues, people assume the agency or office that put it out is trying to hide something. Here's a perfect example, offered by the television reporter cited earlier:

The deputy assistant secretary is there, in all of his deputy assistant secretary-hood, trying to explain this and he's not speaking English. He's saying that "the share of the youth cohort that has sustainable exposure to illicit substances has been trending downward," when what he really means is fewer kids are using drugs. So speak English. Ask yourself if your next-door neighbor will understand what you're saying. How would you say it on the telephone to your mother? Write it down that way.

Don't let a crisis or emergency situation, destroy the quality of what you say publicly or affect how you handle the media. "Take a breath and tell them you have to get back to them," says the former senior White House executive—"you have to track it down, round it up, find out." Don't jump out with statements or position papers before you know what's actually happening. "It's just a question of experience and judgment," as the White House official sees it. "Sometimes, if you just let it go, it turns out not as big a crisis as you thought it might be."

Capable press spokespersons are vital. Maybe they have been journalists themselves, maybe not, but they have to be people who can talk with calm confidence to the press in any setting, on any basis, individually or in formal briefings. Good spokespersons are articulate, informed, and up-to-date on the institutions they represent, their policies, and their actions. Remember that spokespersons are only as good as the quality of their information and access to policy makers. Deny them either of these, and you cripple their ability to advance or defend the interests of their agencies or the administration. Make them mouthpieces only, without reasonable latitude to think, inquire, or speak on their own, and the media will ignore them. Take them into your confidence and trust, and they will help you get the results you're looking for.

Surviving in the government/media culture. The fourth important component in a good media strategy is productive working relationships with journalists, in which each side has reasonable confidence and can expect reasonable treatment. Right, you might well say—and, in the current Washington climate, about as likely as the sun rising in the west.

True, government and media co-exist in a wary relationship too often characterized by mutual suspicion. True, there are certain mind-sets on both sides—among them, that government executives are obfuscating, over-loyal, condescending, usually ready to run for protective cover; that reporters are imperious, self-important, poorly informed, vulnerable to the instincts of the herd. No one would deny that there is more than a little justification for these sentiments. But they shouldn't dominate the scene. Consider the following excerpts from the comments of three of the print and television journalists quoted earlier as they focused on this question of attitude:

Newspaper correspondent: *"Reporters don't expect you to make yourself look bad or your agency look bad. In fact, a lot of times, part of our mission is to present a balanced story, whatever it is. To be fair, we try to let each side make its very best argument. We'll sort through a lot of listening to try to get the kernel of what your case is. Don't presume that some-*

one is coming at you with any particular agenda or ideological bias or even to make you look bad."

Television anchor: *"Credibility is all we have. Without it we have no reason to do what we do. Why should we risk our credibility by misrepresenting the information that is given us? We may test the information. But it would be foolhardy of us, whose livelihood depends on credibility, to try to manipulate the facts until they become non-facts.*

Newspaper correspondent: *"I expect people to tell me the truth and deal with me in good faith and they only get one chance. If they don't, then I know where they are and can never trust them again. That doesn't mean I would never talk to them again. It's just that I have a sense of what their ethics are."*

Television correspondent: *"Ninety percent of people in government think the media only care when they screw up. Wrong. Yes, the media are fascinated when government screws up. Bad news is interesting. But the media love it when people in government win, when they succeed. Help them help you tell your own story."*

Newspaper correspondent: *"It's a really delicate human relationship. In the end we're just all people and we don't want to burn our sources. We want to be able to come back to you on another day and have you take our phone calls and give us information. But we don't want to be in the bag for somebody either. It's a delicate line to walk."*

Leaks

At some point most political leaders, appointed as well as elected, find themselves dealing with the consequences of anonymously disclosed information, or leaks. Typically, a leak is the product of a one-on-one contact with a journalist initiated by an individual with the intention of exerting a specific effect. Because of its total lack of sourcing, any information that gets into the media in this way needs extra scrutiny.

How do you know a leak when you see one? While it's not always simple, one frequent clue is the complete anonymity of the source—though that by itself is not conclusive. Second, since they are agenda-driven, leaked stories usually have some kind of target: a policy, a cause, an action, an individual. Third, now and then a story based on a leak will claim to reveal confidential or surprising information, previously undivulged, perhaps with a whiff of the sensational.

Bottom Line

The evidence suggests that an objective, outgoing stance with the media over the long term is likely to produce similar treatment in return. Will there be exceptions and aberrations? Of course. Can a federal department or agency afford to relax when its relations with the media are in good shape? Of course not. It should carefully think out its media operation and carefully manage it—all the time. There's no such thing as a free ride with the media. Whatever the degree of pain or pleasure you think you are deriving from media coverage of your agency, the coverage isn't going to go away. It only makes sense, therefore, to invest the extra effort that makes it as positive and beneficial as possible.

Working with Career Executives to Manage for Results

By Dana Michael Harsell, Department of Political Science, Hartwick College

Historically, the relationships between political appointees and career executives have been marked with some degree of tension, especially during a transition in leadership. Career executives are perceived by new appointees as continuing the agenda of the previous political leaders, and new political leaders are perceived by careerists as bringing in a new but unclear agenda of changes that may not be anchored in the context of what the agency does.

However, recent management reforms based in both legislation and presidential direction have created a new environment in many agencies that promotes a joint political/career focus on better managing for results related to agency missions.

Based on in-depth observations in three agencies—the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in the Department of Labor—this new environment seems to have contributed to constructive improvements in the relationships between political appointees and career senior executives. The two management reforms that were cited as contributing to this refocused relationship are the Government Performance and Results Act and the President's Management Agenda.

The Government Performance and Results Act. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) represents one of the most sweeping managerial reform efforts in the post–World War II period. At its core, it attempts to improve internal agency management by requiring a clear articulation of strategic plans, annual operating plans, and an annual report on performance against the plan for the prior year. GPRA differs from previous reform efforts because it is grounded in statute. As a result, it has successfully survived a transition between two ideologically diverse presidential administrations.

One of the anticipated byproducts of GPRA-mandated changes is that the law seems to be serving as a positive bridge in communications between career managers and political appointees. Data from the three case study agencies demonstrate that GPRA requirements have had a positive effect on the career/political appointee relationships, which traditionally are strained during a transition between political leaders, either between or within the same administration.

These positive, if unanticipated, effects stem from a number of cultural and institutional changes embedded in GPRA's statutory requirements. For example, the law creates a "common language" between these two executive-branch actors, allowing them to engage each other in ways they had not before. This new pattern of engagement was most apparent during the initial transition in political leadership, a time that is often stressful for careerists and political appointees. During the transition, many politicals and careerists engaged each other in a process of formal goal setting and revision, as required by GPRA. The career interviewees in the three agency case studies generally characterized this as greatly exceeding the benefits of the traditional transition dialogues that had taken place in the past. The interviews also suggest that the GPRA process has contributed to a number of more substantively meaningful mutual outputs, and may also inhibit the tendency for political and career leadership to inhabit their separate policy spheres without really interacting with one another.

Since GPRA is grounded in law, agencies are legally accountable for its provisions. GPRA implementation and compliance enjoyed sustained support from both the Clinton administration and a few very vocal "GPRA champions" within Congress. These attributes further set GPRA apart from the litany of administratively based reform efforts that frequently ended with the presidential administrations that inaugurated them.

GPRA also departs from many previous administratively centered reforms as it represents an attempt to rationalize the decision making process through requiring the use and continual development of a number of managerial tools, including mission statements, short-term and long-term strategic plans, performance measurement systems, and the dissemination of agency results to Congress, the Executive and agency stakeholders. While it is impractical to think that any reform can unequivocally rationalize the political process, the evidence from the three case studies suggests that this rationalization process has helped to engage these two sets of actors, promoted deliberation and meaningful interactions, and even encouraged creative tensions between the two.

The President's Management Agenda. The results of the case studies also suggest that GPRA's contributions toward improving communications between career and political executives have been sustained by the most recent executive-based reform effort, the George W. Bush administration's President's Management Agenda (PMA). The PMA is a broad-based executive managerial reform effort that is managed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). According to John Kamensky, Senior Fellow at the IBM Center for The Business of Government, the PMA is a strong, disciplined focus on meeting tough but achievable goals. The PMA was designed, in part, to build on the framework established by GPRA.

The PMA seeks to improve agency performance among five government-wide management areas: human capital, competitive sourcing, improved financial management, expanded electronic government, and budget and performance integration. Agency performance is graded on a red/yellow/green scale via OMB's executive branch management scorecard list. The scorecard ranks the performance of 26 executive agencies (14 cabinet departments and 12 independent agencies) along the five management areas. Agencies are given a red, yellow, or green score for each of these criteria on a semi-annual basis; a red score indicates poor performance, yellow indicates mixed results, and green indicates the agency has met or exceeded the standards for success. OMB also developed the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) to support the budget and performance integration component of the President's Management Agenda. PART was created on the assumption that GPRA and the PMA share the common goal of linking performance information to the budgetary process, but also on the assumption that much of the performance data generated from GPRA is not being used to inform agency or program decisions.

Analysis of the Three Case Studies

While the GPRA and PMA reform efforts differ somewhat in their orientation (one interviewee described GPRA as a long-term capacity-building exercise and the PMA as a mechanism to achieve shorter-term political goals), they reinforce each other in many substantive ways. The PMA has done much to sustain GPRA in the wake of waning congressional interest, and GPRA serves as an underlying framework to achieve PMA goals. This research also suggests that the GPRA process—and subsequent efforts by the PMA—have laid down and reinforced a managerial framework that has demonstrably enhanced political appointee and career manager relationships by promoting cooperation and helping these two actors overcome natural barriers to consensual management.

Both political and career executives have employed GPRA's statutory results-oriented framework and the executive-centered efforts of the PMA to smooth the often stressful process of transition and to enhance the appointee/careerist relationship more generally. Put simply, the focus of GPRA and the PMA on improved government performance depends in vital ways on reduced tensions between the two basic constituencies of the U.S. executive branch. And structural barriers have, it appears, begun to fall, thanks in part to these reforms.

Given the mandate of GPRA and the PMA to enhance government performance, their effect on this fundamental bureaucratic relationship is vital. Whether these performance management systems can help promote comity and productive relationships is worth exploring in greater depth. Additionally, this research can provide a guide for federal managers to use the management tools established by GPRA and the PMA, especially during future transitions of political leadership when these two executive-branch actors are in the very early stages of forging new working relationships.

Agencies have used GPRA to improve both the leadership transition process and subsequent exchanges between political appointees and career executives. Regarding the former, the strategic planning process has brought these two layers of management together in ways they might not have prior to GPRA.

Additionally, incongruent policy objectives between old and new political leadership can be addressed through a formal update of an agency's long-term strategic plan; high-ranking careerists are often central to such updates. This process has the added benefit of clearly and publicly establishing an agency's new policy objectives early in each new administration; in principle, this may strengthen or accelerate productive relationships among these layers of management. GPRA has helped to create a "common language" for careerists and political appointees, helping careerists to communicate a "performance culture" to their new political leaders.

Evidence also demonstrates that the GPRA process is perceived as being "owned" by the careerists, enabling them to approach new politicals with an established management framework to help mobilize and carry out their new policy directives. GPRA's statutory framework provides a level of continuity during political leadership transitions that can be adjusted around the margins to reflect the policy goals and directions of the new administration. Additionally, careerists with well-functioning strategic planning and performance reporting systems in place are also in a better position to manage for results; that is, the ability to better direct their agencies' budgetary and human capital resources toward the policy objectives set by their new political leadership.

Conversely, the PMA is a process that is perceived as being owned by political appointees. The PMA has helped to drive and sustain agency interest in GPRA—even as congressional interest in GPRA seems to be waning. More importantly, the PMA's ambitious goal-setting requirements have helped to sustain a transformation of agency culture inaugurated by GPRA.

Methodology Used to Develop Study Findings

To what extent can existing reform efforts create a bridge between political and career executives? To answer this question, this inquiry assesses the effects of GPRA and the PMA on the career/political appointee relationships using a variety of approaches. Primary data comes from 43 in-depth interviews, the bulk of which were conducted with career managers and political appointees in three case study agencies:

- Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
- Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in the Department of Labor

Additional interviewees included congressional staffers, personnel from the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office, as well as performance management, GPRA, and PMA scholars and practitioners. Other data sources include congressional legislative history, various scholarly assessments of GPRA and the PMA, and specifically GPRA- and PMA-related documents intended for both public and internal consumption.

Findings Derived from Case Studies

The three case studies of agencies' experiences in implementing both GPRA and the PMA, and their joint effects on relationships between career and political executives in a transition of political leadership, yielded a series of findings that can help new political appointees as they take on the challenges of leadership in a new environment.

Finding 1: GPRA has created a common language for politicals and careerists, and this common language offers a number of benefits to the political/careerist relationship.

Finding 2: The GPRA process helped smooth the transition in political leadership from the Clinton to the Bush administration.

Finding 3: Updating GPRA required plans to better reflect the policy goals of the new administration during the transition of political leadership was a beneficial exercise and, in principle, has the potential to strengthen or accelerate productive relationships among careerists and political appointees.

Finding 4: Setting ambitious goals may also help improve relationships.

Finding 5: The GPRA process is perceived as being "owned" by careerists; however, it is also seen as a tool that can be used to help political leadership advance the goals and policy agenda of the current administration.

Finding 6: Generally, the political staff tends to be more focused on the President's Management Agenda, and career staff and managers tend to be more GPRA oriented.

Finding 7: Congressional interest in GPRA may be waning.

Finding 8: Interviewees in all three agencies reported a positive shift in department culture and internal management practices and generally attributed these shifts to GPRA.

Finding 9: Under some conditions, the GPRA and PMA process may help to exacerbate tensions between political appointees and career managers.

Finding 1. GPRA has created a common language for politicals and careerists, and this common language offers a number of benefits to the political/careerist relationship.
Many interviewees noted that, in the past, it was easy for political appointees and careerists to operate within their own "parallel universes" without interacting much with one another. One interviewee suggested that GPRA, the PMA, and PART—and the process of goal setting and performance measurement that each requires—can create a convergence of interests by establishing the grounds for a constructive dialogue between politicals and careerists. Another program director likened careerist/political interactions to two college wrestlers who continually circle the mat but never really engage each other. He added that GPRA is the mechanism that allows these two individuals to engage each other on a number of issues.

A number of interviewees suggested that data generated from PMA and GPRA exercises can make it easier for careerists to approach political appointees regarding their policy decisions, if necessary. One interviewee noted that careerists now have information at their disposal to say, "Hey boss, that's a great idea, but…" or even "Hey boss, why don't we find another way to do this because the proposed way *is illegal.…*" One specific example of this type of interaction occurred in HUD during the political leadership transition. Regarding one program, an early revision of the interim strategic plan did not include one of the program's core functions as authorized by Congress. Careerists were able to approach the assistant secretary who oversaw their program about their concern. One interviewee recounted that he "was able to go to meetings with the secretary and the other assistant secretaries and say, 'Hey, wait a minute, you've left out a large part of the department here.' " The interim strategic plan was then revised to include this core programmatic component, and both political and career interviewees who spoke about this example reported this as a mutually beneficial experience.

Another career interviewee noted that GPRA has caused the discussion between careerists and politicals to be more strategic, has given careerists and political appointees similar tools to manage, and—most importantly—has established "a new managerial discipline" in his agency. Likewise, a political interviewee noted that GPRA-generated performance information helps both politicals and careerists, stating that "anytime you can get solid, measurable results to show people, it removes the skepticism … anytime you can remove the 'I think' part of the statement, you're going to have a lot more credibility." One interviewee also noted the usefulness of the GPRA framework for the Bush administration's performance and budget integration initiative under the PMA, which links program performance to the budgetary process:

> ... before, we used to present our budget in terms of activity measures. Now we have to present our budget in terms of what results are expected. And that is probably going to be institutionalized. So the political folks, they do use a common language to defend their budgets in terms of GPRA terminology. So that seems to be a positive effect.

Another benefit of this common language is the formalization and institutionalization of clear goals and responsibilities. One interviewee from NASA added:

> I think that GPRA and strategic plans set the framework; they're the road map for everything that we do. The vision is very broad and the mission even is broad. But, if you can't see what we're doing in there somewhere, we ought to be out of that business. So I think that forces—whether you're talking career people or career and political—it's a forcing function that keeps people on the same page. And whether it helps them work better together or more collaboratively … what I think it does is sets kind of a clear road map, so you do not have the divergence that you might have otherwise. It just makes things clearer. And from that, I think that you've got more clarity in terms of responsibilities and roles and who's doing what.

In contrast, one OSHA interviewee noted a lag between the time program data is collected and the time that it can be used to measure outcomes (up to 18 months in some cases), and suggested that this lag can sometimes limit the usefulness of results data for career/political interactions. Given the short tenure of many political appointees, this lag may prevent some politicals from evaluating programs initiated during their tenure. Finally, another interviewee suggested that sometimes performance data can demonstrate that a program is working too well and that data can be used to cut politically charged programs in spite of their success. He cited the example of the Clinton administration's $15 million gun buyback program, in which HUD distributed monies to local law enforcement agencies to buy back and destroy guns near federally funded housing projects. Data suggests that over 20,000 guns were destroyed in the program's first year. The interviewee suggested that this program was too successful for the new presidential administration, and the program was subsequently halted by the Bush administration.

Finding 2. The GPRA process helped smooth the transition in political leadership from the Clinton to the Bush administration. Although GPRA requires agencies to submit an update to their long-term strategic plan to OMB every three years, many departments and agencies updated their strategic plans early to better reflect the values and policy goals of the Bush administration. Interviewees in each agency generally reported that the updates were a very collaborative process between political appointees and careerists. However, there was some evidence to suggest that the amount of collaboration between politicals and careerists also varied by office or program, and at times there may have been less substantive involvement by the career staff in the strategic planning updates.

An interviewee from HUD suggested that the planning process created by GPRA is the most important part of smoothing transitions, as it "connects political will with strategic directions of departments and programs." He added that the process allows careerists and politicals to evaluate policy and program administration all the way to their ultimate goal, and to consider the effects of both "achieving this goal and who is contributing all along the way." Another interviewee suggested that GPRA allows the "communication of a performance culture" to new political appointees.

One program director added that the benefit of GPRA is that it has institutionalized "repeatable transaction cycles" within his agency. He explained that under these cycles, an underlying management structure is present when new political leadership assumes power. "Road maps" for the agency are in place and careerists are able to adjust them as necessary. With these repeatable transaction cycles, agencies also have increased internal controls and are better able to know what they are currently doing, which allows a "match between what we say we do, and what we in fact do." Finally, a political appointee interviewed suggests that the GPRA process:

> ... definitely helps that transition go smoother, because before you had something in place like GPRA, you'd have a political person coming in and a career person telling him that "this is the way we've always done it." And the political person saying that "well, you've been here too long, because this is the way the outside world is doing it—this is how we're going to do it." And you don't have as much of that when you have something like a framework that you have to follow to a certain extent.

Interestingly, interviewees from NASA generally indicated that GPRA was beneficial during the transition, but were somewhat more mixed as to the extent to which it contributed to smoothing the transition. A few of these interviewees suggested that NASA was less political than other agencies, with only four Senate-confirmed political appointees and seven Schedule C appointees. Moreover, NASA's latest administrator was appointed and confirmed over 11 months into the Bush administration. Regarding the transition, one NASA interviewee suggested that:

> ... having the systems, or the process—the requirements to have certain things in place helped with the transition, but we started anew when Sean O'Keefe came. And I would suspect when he leaves that there will probably be a similar kind of effort. But, it does ensure some continuity because our work … is not just short-term programs and projects. They are multi-year—space exploration and aeronautics technology and things like that. So while somebody can come in and change some of the direction based on a new strategic plan or a new strategic vision and mission, you don't just start canning things you've made a significant investment in. So I think it's a helpful thing, and I think there is enough flexibility in the system to allow continuity but at the same time give flexibility to allow new leadership to be able to do what they believe needs to be done in the agency using the GPRA process.

Finding 3. Updating GPRA required plans to better reflect the policy goals of the new administration during the transition of political leadership was a beneficial exercise and, in principle, has the potential to strengthen or accelerate productive relationships among careerists and political appointees.
Arguably, long-term strategic planning promotes continuity and stability between changes in political leadership and can help depoliticize agency management. However, during the transition from Clinton to Bush, the new political leadership in many agencies updated their long-term strategic goals and revised many of their performance report measurements to better reflect the policy objectives of the new administration. This was accomplished through the provision of GPRA that requires agencies to update their strategic plans every three years (though in all cases the update occurred before the third year). Interviews reveal that, in principle, this process of revising and updating GPRA requirements may help accelerate productive working relationships.

First, there is an existing management framework in place, which provides an institutionalized means for careerists and politicals to reach out to each other early during the transition. One political appointee noted that this is true:

> ... to the extent that the political lead is savvy enough to understand how he or she is going to treat everyone on day one. Some people will come in and say, "Now there's a new sheriff in town, and I don't care what you've done before—things are going to be different." And not really appreciating the fact that it takes a long time to reinvent the wheel. Take the wheel that is there and fix it. Some are savvy enough to know that "I've only got 18 months in order for me to be successful; I've got to get key people on board with my vision."

Second, to the extent that revisions are a collaborative effort between political appointees and career managers, this process brings career managers and political appointees together early regarding policy-related matters. Additionally, incongruent policy objectives between the old and new political leadership can be addressed through a formal update of the agency's long-term strategic plan; high-level careerists are often central to such updates. This process has the added benefit of clearly and publicly establishing the policy objectives and expectations of new political leadership.

Agency interviews also revealed that this process might help accelerate the learning curve for political appointees. One political appointee pointed out that any new political leadership must learn to negotiate a number of administrative, legislative, and political constraints that agencies face over the budgetary process. Arguably, the performance information generated by GPRA and the extent to which political appointees tap the expertise of careerists can help them learn to negotiate these constraints. Another career interviewee suggested that this process benefits both politicals and careerists:

> ... the current administration came in and dealt with the previous strategic plan, but then said all right, and came up with an interim strategic plan, and modified all of the indicators in the annual performance plan. So I think it helps both. The politicals have a better idea of what the programs are doing to see these concrete indicators and then that helps them focus with a clear vision of what they want … the direction that they want to go. I think it helps everyone say, "Oh, this is what we are aiming to do."

More generally, one interviewee in HUD noted that GPRA gives careerists and politicals a number of "mutually interrelated objectives" to address. At the very least, he suggested that these statutory objectives can help encourage reasonable working relationships between politicals and careerists. He added that for the new political leaders, there is a "law about HUD, a law about what is expected about HUD and all federal agencies," which allows careerists and politicals to look for opportunities. They can tweak strategic goals, find common ground, and help the president achieve his policies, "all under the context of HUD." Finally, he added that a "big plus" of GPRA is the "state of rapport, cooperation, and understanding" that was not present prior to GPRA.

Thus, any process that helps streamline or reduce the adjustment period could help solidify these relationships earlier and subsequently reduce tensions in the long run. With this said, it is possible that GPRA requirements could also help reduce barriers between careerists and politicals by bringing these two layers of management together in the pursuit of superordinate departmental goals.

Finding 4. Setting ambitious goals may also help improve relationships.

Interview data also suggest that the formalized process of goal setting under GPRA—and to some extent the current efforts of the PMA—might help build a foundation to foster productive working relationships between political appointees and careerists, especially where setting ambitious goals is concerned. One interviewee suggested that ambitious goal setting increases dialogue and promotes cooperation between politicals and careerists. Good career program managers can help with this by recognizing crosscutting goals and leveraging agencies with similar goals and stakeholders (and in many cases quasi-government entities) toward the fulfillment of that goal. This interviewee also noted that when confronted with ambitious goals, "necessity is the mother of all invention," and politicals and careerists often find innovative means to achieve these goals.

Through the PMA, the Bush administration and HUD's political leadership set two ambitious but attainable goals: increasing minority homeownership by 5.5 million units and eliminating chronic homelessness in 10 years. Career and political interviewees indicated that these ambitious goals brought workers together, energized them, and got them excited to achieve these goals. One HUD political appointee noted that the PMA scorecard also helps to inject a healthy dose of competition between agency programs and across similar agencies, stating that these programs "want to be the first to get to green." Another interviewee stated that ambitious goal setting:

> ... speaks to better government—a federal government that is making a difference. I think there is a lot said about creating goals that are loftier than what you are accustomed to. It does create an incentive for greater cooperation internally, because goals are set at a level that requires you to stretch yourself higher than your comfort zone in just getting the job done—punching in and punching out. But setting higher goals creates that synergy for greater cooperation internally.

Finally, another appointee added that ambitious or visionary goal setting has the potential to promote comity between politicals and careerists to the extent that they both agree with the overarching goal. He cited HUD's goal to end chronic homelessness within 10 years and stated that HUD's efforts toward this nonpartisan goal have made significant changes in the way homelessness is now addressed across the nation—and especially by federal, state, and local government agencies. In contrast, this interviewee suggested that ambitious partisan goals may not promote the same degree of comity or relationship-building potential among politicals and careerists.

Finding 5. The GPRA process is perceived as being "owned" by careerists; however, it is also seen as a tool that can be used to help political leadership advance the goals and policy agenda of the current administration. Several interviewees suggested that GPRA is a process that is owned by the careerists, and another interviewee likened GPRA to a "constitution" for career managers to carry out their agency's mission and offered the following observation:

> GPRA, with its focus on performance, gave the public servant the ability to rise up and say, "OK, I'm a public servant being held to account for performance, and this is what it will take for me to perform." Then if the agency or the Congress wants to say "no," then that's perfectly all right because the process has worked. But at least the public servant has had a chance to stand up and say "this is what it will take to run this program in the best way." Whereas during that period of across-the-board prorated cuts, if you proposed anything other than simply taking your cut and saluting, you were on the verge of losing your job or severely damaging your career. So I say that the law has had—and can have—an even stronger effect on the concept of management.

Some interviewees suggested that, through the managerial tools set forth by GPRA, it is possible for careerists to increase their responsiveness to politicals in fulfillment of the department's core missions. This observation is also supported by a 2004 Government Accountability Office (GAO) finding that suggests "within agencies, GPRA documents can provide a context of missions, goals, and strategies that political appointees can use to articulate agencies' priorities." One career interviewee added that:

> ... we do have a better idea of where the politicals want to go, by going through the process of developing their overall goals, and, of course, we sort of fill in the words. But it does allow us to get a better sense. For example, the previous administration had a very strong focus on economic development. If you look at our strategic plan that was done a year ago—the latest one—there's not a strategic objective for economic development. So clearly in this administration that is not as much of a focus.

However, another interviewee was very careful to note that while the process resides with the careerists, the goals attached to the process ultimately reside with the political staff (but still within the parameters of the department's general mission). To the extent that political appointees and careerists work within the parameters of GPRA, these tools can be a force that can promote cooperative management.

Finding 6. Generally, the political staff tends to be more focused on the President's Management Agenda, and career staff and managers tend to be more GPRA oriented. The PMA is the primary vehicle of the Bush administration to manage to its policy objectives, so it is reasonable for political appointees to focus on this aspect of agency management. Additionally, many career interviewees suggested that political appointees were less concerned with GPRA minutiae than its overall results and that the PMA and PART were the primary managerial focus by politicals in all three agencies. For instance, NASA has a team leader for each of the five PMA management areas, and team leaders meet weekly with the administrator to report on their team's progress toward their PMA goals.

Interviewees also characterized GPRA and the PMA very differently. One interviewee characterized GPRA as capacity building and the PMA as a tool to realize short-term political goals. Another interviewee attributed GPRA's focus to good government and long-term achievable milestones and attributed the PMA's focus to episodic milestones and tangible, achievable goals. (Yet another interviewee characterized PMA goals as résumé builders for political appointees.) Generally interviewees reported that PMA and GPRA goals generally complemented each other or built off of one another at both the program and agency or department levels. Often PMA goals were incorporated into the overall goal-setting framework established by GPRA in each agency. One interviewee characterized the PMA and PART as follows:

> PART is a piece of the PMA. The PMA is performance, results-based management. Everything they try and do is to become more efficient, more effective, and that's really the foundation of the five management areas. With the PMA, there is stuff that you try and do, but that is being handled at a much broader level. So it doesn't affect you as rapidly as it does if you're working for a program.

Interestingly, career interviewees who work closely with GPRA suggest that the potential for career/political tensions exists between the President's Management Agenda, the OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool, or PART, and GPRA. Interviewees reported that career staff and managers are becoming burdened by the voluminous amount of time and paperwork that goes into GPRA, PMA, and PART compliance, and noted the potential for competing goals, measurements, and lines of accountability between the three initiatives. One political appointee described the process surrounding a PART review:

> So eight months ago they said, "Hey, this year's PART analysis they're doing [program name withheld]. Well, as soon as they say that, you're getting a consultant, because you need someone in the office who can focus totally on PART. Because you need to get all of your reporting stuff together, because the way they want to see the information may not be the way that you have the information and what they want. You may do it, but you have to get it into their format to give it to them to prove that's what you do.
>
> The PART is much more stressful, because everyone realizes it's tied into your money line. With PART, you're defending your program, and that's the difference. The other PMA stuff is just adjustments to how you are doing things to make it more efficient. PART is where they are actually saying to you: "You know what, you tell me … you show me that your program works. Don't tell me about it, but show me it works, and then we'll give you money." So there is much more pressure.

Many interviewees described PART as a "painful" process. Although the PMA and PART are examples of executive-based management reform efforts, one interviewee stated that he felt that they have both made significant inroads into agency culture that would probably survive the Bush administration.

Finding 7. Congressional interest in GPRA may be waning.

A few interviewees felt that the information that their department generated for its GPRA requirement went relatively unnoticed by Congress. This "waning" may be due in part to a shift in priorities for the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Governmental Reform. Indeed, until his retirement in 2000, Senator Fred Thompson chaired the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, championed GPRA, and was quite vociferous regarding GPRA oversight. One interviewee felt that congressional interests and agency involvement would continue to wane without such an outspoken proponent. However, a number of interviewees from HUD noted that some congressional committees and subcommittees that oversee HUD and its programs frequently make use of HUD planning and performance information generated by GPRA.

Interviewees offered a range of views regarding the current state of GPRA within these agencies. One interviewee who worked very closely on GPRA's implementation and oversight felt that GPRA was fading out in favor of the President's Management Agenda, although an interviewee from the Department of Labor suggested that the PMA has helped to sustain and give new life to GPRA. In spite of sporadic and sometimes episodic interest or support from Congress, virtually all interviewees articulated that GPRA-mandated processes (but often with the exception of the workload it entails) have made a difference and are eminently beneficial to overall agency management. Interviewees generally reported that the processes mandated by GPRA were very much a part of current government and agency culture, and many suggested that they would continue many of the practices set by GPRA if GPRA requirements were to cease.

Parenthetically, two interviewees who worked with the drafting of GPRA suggested that the extent to which GPRA is fading marks the extent of its success—claiming that its intellectual founders felt they could claim success if the acronym faded from the lexicon, but the statutory requirements remained entrenched in government agency culture. These interviewees added that the Bush administration's PMA would not be possible without the solid groundwork set by GPRA in the areas of defining missions, setting strategic goals, and measuring performance.

One problem associated with waning congressional interest is the potential for GPRA compliance to degenerate into a mere paperwork exercise. This could become a source of tension between careerists and politicals if GPRA becomes a compliance exercise and the departmental operations begin to deviate or "creep" from departmental missions and goals established per GPRA. Additionally, tensions between careerists and politicals may increase if competing goals and performance measures exist between executive reform efforts and GPRA. However, another program director noted that even if congressional interest is waning, GPRA-generated performance and outcome information is utilized "when public interests representing their clients for state and local governments go to testify on the Hill about our effectiveness."

Finding 8. Interviewees in all three agencies reported a positive shift in department culture and internal management practices and generally attributed these shifts to GPRA.

Many interviewees suggested that GPRA acted as a mechanism to compel them to review and revise their management practices. A few interviewees confided that, initially, GPRA was viewed as "another flavor of the month" and not taken very seriously, but noted that the overall process of developing and honing strategic plans and performance measurement systems has been beneficial to overall agency management. Indeed, one NASA careerist stated:

> ... and that's one of the positive sides of all of this; it drove us to think about longer-term outcome goals. Because we certainly had to think in terms of what are we really doing in the long run, what kind of knowledge are we basically trying to achieve 10 years out.… And every year we'll come back and evaluate internally our progress against the road map that we've bought into with our stakeholders and the OMB and Congress and everybody else.

A career interviewee within HUD characterized the shift as very positive and asserted that GPRA has brought a new discipline to HUD management that is based on the annual budget. Another HUD interviewee characterized the overall agency culture as "slow moving and bureaucratic," but suggested that GPRA has helped to streamline certain aspects of management. Moreover, an interviewee from NASA added that:

> ... another area it's been useful is that it's been a forcing mechanism to really take the strategic planning process seriously. And our strategic planning activity is rather intensive in terms of getting our community on board and how our strategic plan has a tie-in with our longer-term goals. We can better manage internally and know how the science questions we're pursuing and the dollars that can be attributed—not at specific targets in any enforceable measure but at the macro level. So there is a relationship now that we feel more comfortable having dollars tied to the outcomes and annual goals and long-term outcome goals.

Finding 9. Under some conditions, the GPRA and PMA process may help to exacerbate tensions between political appointees and career managers.

Interviewees suggested that at times the sheer volume of compliance activities for GPRA, PART, and the PMA could increase tensions between politicals and careerists. One interviewee noted that a significant amount of her time and resources was devoted to meeting requirements and that these resources may be better allocated elsewhere.

Additionally, one political noted that agencies have "dictates from multiple masters"—for example, the Hill, other agencies, the executive branch, OMB, and political appointees. Thus, GPRA and PMA compliance also has the potential to place careerists at odds with any one of these organizations.

GPRA, PMA, and most performance management systems are predicated on the idea that performance information will inform the budgetary process. In theory, this process should remain apolitical. However, one interviewee explained that politics creeps into this process and that natural tensions between political appointees and career managers can result, especially when careerists are caught in the middle of executive and legislative budgetary conflicts. For instance, PART links program performance to the budgetary process; programs that meet performance goals should see increased budgets and poor performers should see budgetary cuts. However, he suggested that politicals might not fully understand that "you cannot fully avoid the congressional part" of the budgetary process. Tensions can arise when programs favored by the executive branch are cut by Congress or when programs that are cut by the executive branch are restored by Congress. In the first example, careerists must continue to execute the program despite a reduction in available resources; in the second example, careerists must continue to faithfully execute a program that their political bosses may not really care about.

Conclusions

The interviews conducted for this study suggest that the results-oriented managerial reforms embodied in GPRA and the PMA have helped to mitigate historic tensions between political appointees and career civil servants by creating a common ground around achieving mission results. Since many of these perennial tensions stem from long-standing differences in perspectives, they are not easily reconciled. Indeed, a long litany of previous administrative reform efforts has largely been ineffectual in reconciling these relationships. However, the statutory basis and longevity of GPRA—and subsequent supporting efforts in the PMA—have helped to change agency culture and institutionalize many of the tenets of performance management in the federal workplace. Moreover, the Bush administration's emphasis on the PMA has helped breathe new life into GPRA. According to many interviewees in this study, it is also likely that aspects of the PMA, including current efforts to connect performance reporting to the budgetary process, will become institutionalized and will survive the Bush administration.

The performance-oriented frameworks offered by GPRA and PMA afford career managers and political appointees many opportunities to reach across the bureaucratic divide to focus on common objectives—getting results Americans care about. Indeed, the most important lessons are those which help to accelerate mutually beneficial working relationships by smoothing the often stressful transition of political leadership, creating a common language for career managers and political appointees, and promoting more substantively meaningful policy making by increasing collaboration between these two executive-branch actors.

Acknowledgments

Funds were generously provided by the IBM Center for The Business of Government and a Maxwell Dissertation Fellowship. The author would like to acknowledge Patricia Ingraham, Suzanne Mettler, and Dale Jones for their support and advice, especially during the early stages of this project. Heartfelt thanks and appreciation go out to Rogan Kersh for his unremitting guidance and superb contributions over the course of the project. Finally, the author wishes to express gratitude to all of the career staff and managers, political appointees, and performance management experts for their participation in the project. Ultimately, any errors or omissions in the project remain the sole responsibility of the author.

Working to Transform Your Organization

By Mark A. Abramson, IBM Center for The Business of Government
and Paul R. Lawrence, IBM Business Consulting Services
(Adapted from *Transforming Organizations*)

Transforming organizations is hard work. It is not for the fainthearted or thin-skinned. A leader is not going to win many new friends or popularity contests by undertaking major transformation initiatives. In spite of the difficulty, we expect transformation to continue as 20th century bureaucracies are streamlined into high-performing 21st century organizations. For executives at the helm of these changes, there is much to learn from the experience of others.

The key question is: How do leaders successfully transform organizations? To better understand the transformation challenge, the IBM Center for The Business Government supported a series of case studies of the most successful transformation initiatives of the 1990s in the federal government. The goal was to document these initiatives and identify lessons learned that could be shared with other executives seeking to change their organization. Organizations selected for case studies were:

- Department of Defense (DoD) under Deputy Secretary (and then Secretary) William Perry. The DoD case study focuses on procurement reform within the Department of Defense, including key roles played by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Paul Kaminski, Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition Reform Colleen Preston, and Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Steve Kelman
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under Director James Lee Witt
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) under Administrator Daniel S. Goldin
- Veterans Health Administration (VHA), Department of Veterans Affairs, under Under Secretary for Health Dr. Kenneth Kizer

From these case studies of the four organizations, eight common lessons emerged about how leaders successfully undertake large-scale transformation initiatives.

Lesson 1: Select the Right Person

The four transformation initiatives all began with the appointment of the right person to the right job in the right organization at the right time. Steven Daniels and Carolyn L. Clark-Daniels write, “Recruitment ... may be one of the president’s … most critical decisions at the start of an administration” (Daniels and Clark-Daniels, 2000). In selecting James Lee Witt to head FEMA, President Clinton selected an individual with extensive experience in emergency management, a sharp departure from past appointments to the agency. Director Witt then used his influence in the appointment process to select a team of political executives who were all experienced and highly qualified in emergency management. Daniels and

Clark-Daniels conclude that the cumulative experience of the senior political appointees vastly improved the organization's capability and made its transformation possible.

The selection of highly qualified, experienced individuals was also key to the success of transformation at DoD. Kimberly A. Harokopus writes: "The leaders of defense procurement reform were remarkably well suited for the tough job at hand. They all had experience with the acquisition process—some as practitioners, others as researchers, still others as members of the defense industry seeking to comply with the sometimes byzantine set of procurement rules. With the exception of Kelman, each had previously worked inside the Pentagon as a military or civilian leader. Each had recognized the failings of the defense acquisition system and each had struggled to remedy it—through advisory boards, informal correspondence to defense leaders, and published scholarly works. It was as if they had been preparing for years to meet this challenge" (Harokopus, 2000).

From his analysis of the VHA transformation, Gary J. Young writes, "VHA's transformation highlights the importance of having leaders whose backgrounds and experiences fit the needs of the transformation" (Young, 2000). Young dates the start of the VHA transformation initiative with the appointment of Dr. Ken Kizer. Young concludes that Dr. Kizer proved to be a highly effective leader for the VHA transformation. His effectiveness, writes Young, was largely the result of the match between his professional experience and the needs of the transformation. "... [A]lthough Dr. Kizer was new to VHA, he did have substantial leadership experience in the public sector.… Dr. Kizer was an astute student of innovations in the financing and delivery of health care services. He had witnessed many innovations firsthand through his professional experiences in California.…"

The appointment of Dan Goldin at NASA also demonstrates the importance of making the right match to the right job. W. Henry Lambright writes: "The choice of Dan Goldin was fortuitous given the need. He was a good match for the organization and times. He replaced a man who was forced to leave because he was not viewed as the right person for the challenges facing the agency…. On the whole, … his original appointment and retention by Clinton were good for NASA and the country" (Lambright, 2001).

Lessons Learned about Transforming Organizations

Lesson 1: Select the right person

Lesson 2: Clarify the mission

Lesson 3: Get the structure right

Lesson 4: Seize the moment

Lesson 5: Communicate, communicate, and communicate

Lesson 6: Involve key players

Lesson 7: Engage employees

Lesson 8: Persevere

Lesson 2: Clarify the Mission

Witt, Dr. Kizer, and Goldin followed similar paths during the early days of their tenure. James Lee Witt spent his initial days refocusing FEMA's mission on emergency management rather than national preparedness. This change in focus redefined the agency's primary client to be disaster victims and served as the central tenet of all the management reforms that followed.

At VHA, Dr. Ken Kizer spent his early days spearheading the creation of a vision for the transformation of the organization. In describing the blueprint report, *Vision for Change,* Young writes, "The document articulated the basic philosophy, principles, and organizational framework to which a transformed VHA would adhere."

At NASA, Dan Goldin went through a similar process. Lambright writes, "Given the budget constraint Goldin faced when he first was appointed, he was forced to deal with the question, 'What do I do to bring NASA's expectations into line with likely funding?' His answer was not to eliminate programs. Rather, he intended to promote technological and managerial reforms that would allow the agency to carry out all of its existing programs and even provide funds to make new starts."

Lesson 3: Get the Structure Right

While leaders frequently shy away from structural reorganizations because of the difficulty in doing so, Dr. Kizer, Witt, and Goldin all decided reorganizations were crucial to their ability to transform their organization. Within the first year of the transformation, Dr. Kizer proposed and enacted a sweeping change in the agency's organizational structure. The new structure entailed the reorganization of all VHA operating units into 22 networks. Marilyn A. DeLuca concludes that large-scale change frequently necessitates organizational redesign. DeLuca writes: "The agency's structure should facilitate reform, and consideration should be given to the function, size, and organizational placement of various managerial and advisory units within the organization. The distance between the agency 'center' and 'field' is important to ensure sound communication and exchange of information. As too much change can create chaos, thoughtfully planned and executed redesign is key. Such redesign should consider the reform objectives as well as organizational culture and the existing productive linkages" (DeLuca, 2000).

To better structure the agency to pursue its newly refocused mission on disaster management, FEMA created new agency directorates organized around the basic functions of emergency management. Director Witt separated the operational components of the State and Local Programs and Support Directorate into separate Preparedeness, Mitigation, and Response and Recovery Directorates. In a finding similar to that of DeLuca, Daniels and Clark-Daniels describe the reorganization process: "Most public officials recognize the importance of matching agency structure to agency policy goals. Implementing a program using existing agency structures and procedures invites policy conflict and the inefficient use of personnel and resources. One of the leading causes of the proliferation of government agencies is the recognition that matching agency structure to agency mission is easier in a new agency than an ongoing one."

Like Dr. Kizer and Witt, Goldin also concluded that organizational realignment was necessary. Six months after his arrival, Goldin reorganized the Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA). In reorganizing OSSA, Lambright writes that Goldin wanted more visibility for the earth observation and life science elements of the enterprise. By splitting OSSA into three offices, earth observations and life sciences would each have its own director.

Lesson 4: Seize the Moment

The key to the success of any executive is finding precisely the right time in the organization's history to undertake large-scale transformation. The DoD team, Dr. Kizer, and Goldin all used the changing external environment to bring about internal transformation of their organizations. Regarding the DoD team, Harokopus writes, "The era of defense procurement reform was also an era of political, technological, and national security changes…. While these conditions created a climate for reform, it was key individuals, taking advantage of those circumstances, which made the crucial difference. Opportunity is worthless unless it is seized. These leaders recognized the opportunity for tremendous change in public management and they acted on it."

The situation at the Veterans Health Administration was similar. By the early 1990s, Young reports that VHA had become out of sync with the prevailing trends in the delivery of health services. The advent of health maintenance organizations and developments in medical technology had begun the shift away from inpatient-based medicine to outpatient-based primary care medicine. Dr. Kizer himself concluded that change within VHA must move in harmony with environmental or externally focused change. Dr. Kizer writes, "Top managers, particularly those in the public sector, cannot hope to stand against the 'forces of nature'.… In the case of the VHA, that means being in sync with broad trends, such as the national revolution in health care, the explosion of biomedical research and knowledge, the shift to 'an information society,' and the aging of the eligible VHA population."

In examining reform within both the United States Veterans Health Administration and the United Kingdom's National Health Service, DeLuca observed the importance of finding a "window of opportunity." She concludes that environmental factors, including socioeconomic and political conditions and pressure from the public or interests groups, can often prompt the need for organizational change.

When he was appointed in 1992, Goldin was given the task "to reinvent NASA in the post–Cold War era and take it into the 21st century." Lambright writes, "When Goldin became administrator, many observers saw NASA as a bloated bureaucracy pursuing missions that took too long, cost too much, and used technology that was old by the time it was put into space." In addition, the changing environment also included new foreign policy objectives. The new NASA administrator, reports Lambright, "would have to deal with the foreign policy need of the United States to forge a new relationship with the Russians and the world. Goldin, through the Space Station, made NASA a positive instrument of this policy need, elevating NASA to a component of presidential foreign policy and making it more relevant to the times."

All the leaders profiled used real and perceived crises to support and speed up their transformation initiatives. Lambright writes, “A crisis situation creates an organizational need for leadership and willingness of the organization to go along, at least for a while. Goldin proved an effective crisis manager. He seized command of Space Station decision making from those formally in charge and created what was, in effect, a parallel unit under his direction, which redesigned the Space Station.”

James Lee Witt effectively used the historically poor reputation of FEMA in 1993 to stimulate change within his organization. The DoD procurement reform team successfully capitalized on the procurement “scandals” of the 1980s to successfully implement procurement changes in the 1990s.

The importance of a perceived crisis cannot be underestimated. Lambright writes: “The lesson is that a crisis can help the leader in forwarding major change. Crisis allows the leader to pull power to himself. Because he spans the boundary across organizational programs and negotiates the space between organization and environment, he is in a strategic position to seize the initiative. He can use a crisis to go beyond incremental to radical change. A leader who successfully leads his organization through a crisis can secure his position, neutralize rivals, and enlarge the change coalition within the organization through his appointees and insiders, who become believers.”

Lesson 5: Communicate, Communicate, and Communicate

All the case studies conclude that effective communication is crucial to the success of any transformation initiative. In the case of procurement reform, Harokopus writes: “… each leader sustained a remarkable communications strategy with constant but varied platforms for publicizing their message. From public speeches at symposia, conferences, and industrial gatherings, to brown bag lunches, town-hall-style meetings, and electronic chat sessions, there was always a variety of styles, media, and audience. The end result was an environment charged with enthusiasm over the new possibilities for acquisition.”

At FEMA, James Lee Witt concluded that external communication was crucial to reshaping the agency. Daniels and Clark-Daniels report that when Witt arrived, he found that “FEMA was used to operating in anonymity, and had no effective plan for involving the media and, by extension, the public in FEMA operations.” Under Witt, the agency reshaped FEMA’s communications to actively engage the media throughout the response and recovery period. “By making the agency more accessible and by providing the media with prompt answers and information, FEMA disarmed much of the inevitable criticism that arose in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. More significantly, the agency opened a two-way channel for information between itself and the disaster victims it was serving,” write Daniels and Clark-Daniels.

DeLuca also found the importance of communication in her cross-national study of health care reform. DeLuca concludes, “Transformation of large systems is best accomplished by setting goals and communicating those objectives both within the organization and to interest groups.” Both DeLuca and Young give the Veterans Health Administration a mixed report on communicating to those both inside and outside of VHA. DeLuca writes, “While the goals were clearly communicated to the VISN (Veterans Integrated Service Networks) and medical center executives, communication varied across other levels of staff and was often lacking to interest groups.”

Young concludes that failure to effectively communicate was a major weakness of the VHA transformation initiative. Young writes: “VHA’s transformation offers another of many examples where conventional communication strategies did not work to keep frontline employees informed during a large-scale change effort. To inform employees about the transformation, the senior leadership team distributed written notices and videotapes, held town meetings, and conducted video conferences. However, the survey data collected as part of this study indicate that these methods of communication were not reaching frontline employees.”

Communication was sometimes a problem at NASA under Dan Goldin. Lambright concludes that a hard-driving administrator with a confrontational style can sometimes shut off the flow of communication. “Communication, communication, and more communication in an organization is the answer to heading off disaster. The communication has to flow freely and candidly from the bottom to the top and vice versa. A leader has to work overtime to assure he gets such communication and feedback. This is especially the case where the change process is so strongly pushed from the top. If a leader is perceived as closed-minded by his officials and staff, he will be a barrier to his own reforms," writes Lambright.

Lesson 6: Involve Key Players

In all the case studies, a key to the organization's successful transformation was the realization that there were nongovernmental entities deeply interested and involved in the organization's business. The challenge was then to find innovative ways in which to engage them in support of the organization's mission. In the case of FEMA, Director Witt consistently emphasized the importance of partnerships with state and local governments, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector.

At the Department of Defense, Secretary William Perry clearly recognized the importance of involving the defense contractor industry in the dialogue over procurement reform. Harokopus writes, "Perry's team was convinced that the acquisition community should be the primary source for reform initiatives." Perry, reports Harokopus, made the entire acquisition community—both those inside and outside of government—party to the problem as well as part of the solution. The Department's Process Action Teams (PATs) were charged to seek defense industry involvement in the development of all procurement reforms.

Based on both the experience of the National Health Service and the Veterans Health Administration, DeLuca concludes that it is essential to involve interest groups and pertinent community members in reform discussions and debates around workable strategies. "While interest-group participation may be perceived as slowing the change process or, more commonly, be restricted due to concern that these groups may derail or undermine change, exclusion of interest groups limits the effectiveness of the reforms in the long run. Cooperative partnerships that permit participation in change, an emphasis on communication, and avoidance of perverse incentives minimize dissatisfaction and tension among staff as well as interest groups," writes DeLuca.

Lesson 7: Engage Employees

While undertaking organizational transformation, agency leadership must pay special attention to employees. Young reports that while VHA had planned several educational and training initiatives as part of their transformation, most of the initiatives were not in place at the time the agency was undergoing its sweeping change in structure. Looking back, Young concludes that "VHA's senior leadership placed too little emphasis on training and education." As a consequence, Young recommends, "… in situations where swift change is deemed necessary, senior managers should not overlook the importance of training and education to support employees in developing needed skills in a timely manner."

DeLuca also emphasizes the need for staff engagement. She writes, "The manner in which reform is introduced, particularly regarding staff involvement and communication, affects the response of staff to the reform process. Leaders should be knowledgeable and sensitive to the process of change, as well as the desired objectives. Employees who are more empowered and engaged in the change are more involved in the reform process."

At the Department of Defense, recognition, awards, and training were integral to the defense reform initiative. Harokopus writes, "Defense procurement could not change without acceptance by the practitioners.… The leadership understood that for practitioners to become reform enthusiasts, they would need incentives for accepting change and reinforcement from top leaders. Acquisition practitioners needed to know that their opinions were valued and their participation was essential. As a result, the leaders focused on a strategy that included recognition, awards, and training."

But not all efforts to engage employees succeed. At NASA, Goldin's efforts to encourage a bottom-up strategy were not totally successful. Lambright reports that Goldin "wanted the organization to reach a consensus and then interact with the public in creating an even larger consensus for change. Unfortunately, this participative strategy was coupled with financial costs. He ordered 'red and blue' teams to counter one another in downsizing various programs, even as they sought a vision statement and engaged in strategy planning. Cutback planning was a threat to many inside officials."

Lesson 8: Persevere

The final lesson is that it isn't going to be easy. The challenge is described well by Gary Young: "All transformations generate controversy and criticism. Such criticism and controversy often distract leaders of transformations from focusing on the central goals of the change effort. In the case of VHA, the senior leadership kept its sights fixed on key transformation goals while making mid-course correction to address technical problems as they were recognized."

"No transformation will be perfect," writes Young, "and those who oppose the changes will seek to exploit flaws or limitations to derail the effort. Leaders of transformation need to be responsive to legitimate criticisms, but they also must avoid being swallowed up in technical details."

Transforming and revitalizing government organizations is difficult, time-consuming, but is possible. The leaders profiled in these case studies demonstrate that transformation can be done. Executives in both the public and private sector can learn much from the experiences of these leaders.

References

Daniels, R. Steven, and Carolyn L. Clark-Daniels. "Transforming Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency." Washington, D.C.: IBM Center for The Business of Government, April 2000.

DeLuca, Marilyn A. "Trans-Atlantic Experiences in Health Reform: The United Kingdom's National Health Service and the United States Veterans Health Administration." Washington, D.C.: IBM Center for The Business of Government, May 2000.

Harokopus, Kimberly A. "Transforming Government: Creating the New Defense Procurement System." Washington, D.C.: IBM Center for The Business of Government, April 2000.

Lambright, W. Henry. "Transforming Government: Dan Goldin and the Remaking of NASA." Washington, D.C.: IBM Center for The Business of Government, March 2001.

Young, Gary J. "Transforming Government: The Revitalization of the Veterans Health Administration." Washington, D.C.: IBM Center for The Business of Government, June 2000.

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Part I

Judith Michaels is the author of *The President's Call: Executive Leadership from FDR to George Bush*. She is currently a freelance writer and consultant. Dr. Michaels recently conducted the interviews for the *2004 Prune Book: Top Management Challenges for Presidential Appointees* prepared by the Council for Excellence in Government. She has also served as an adjunct professor in public policy at the Institute for Experiential Learning, in urban policy at Goucher College, and in government and policy at George Mason University. She received a doctoral fellowship at the General Accounting Office, where she developed, administered, and analyzed a survey of Senate-confirmed presidential appointees. Her degrees include her Ph.D. from the College of Urban Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Delaware, and her Master of Public Administration from the Department of Public Administration, University of Baltimore.

Part II

John H. Trattner is senior writer and editor at the Council for Excellence in Government. Mr. Trattner is the author of the seven volumes to date in the Council's *Prune Book* series as well as *A Survivors' Guide for Government Executives* and other publications. He served as a career U.S. diplomat for 20 years, with assignments in Warsaw, Strasbourg, Paris, Brussels, and Washington. At the Department of State, he was executive assistant to then deputy secretary of state Warren Christopher and press spokesman of the department under Edmund Muskie. On leaving government in 1983, he served as press secretary to former U.S. Senator George J. Mitchell.

Dana Michael Harsell is an assistant professor at Hartwick College, in Oneonta, New York, where he teaches classes in American government, public administration, and political psychology. His research interests include administrative state reform, public management, and managing for results. While at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Professor Harsell worked as a research assistant for the Government Performance Project and helped assess the managing-for-results capacity of 40 of the nation's largest county governments. He also spent a year as the project manager for the New Jersey Initiative, which used Government Performance Project methodology to assess the management capacities of municipal-level governments in New Jersey.

Professor Harsell holds a B.A. in political science and psychology and an M.A. in political science, both from the University of Montana, and is near completion of a Ph.D. in political science from Syracuse University. Upcoming publications include a chapter in *Managing for Performance in State and Local Government,* edited by Patricia Ingraham, and an article in the *Journal of Political Science Education*.

Mark A. Abramson is executive director of the IBM Center for The Business of Government, a position he has held since July 1998. Prior to the Center, he was chairman of Leadership Inc. From 1983 to 1994, Mr. Abramson served as the first president of the Council for Excellence in Government. Previously, Mr. Abramson served as a senior program evaluator in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

He is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. In 1995, he served as president of the National Capital Area Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration. Mr. Abramson has taught at George Mason University and the Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville, Virginia.

Mr. Abramson is the co-editor of *Transforming Organizations, E-Government 2001, Managing for Results 2002, Innovation, Human Capital 2002, Leaders, E-Government 2003, The Procurement Revolution,* and *New Ways of Doing Business*. He also edited *Memos to the President: Management Advice from the Nation's Top Public Administrators* and *Toward a 21st Century Public Service: Reports from Four Forums*. He is also the co-editor (with Joseph S. Wholey and Christopher Bellavita) of *Performance and Credibility: Developing Excellence in Public and Nonprofit Organizations,* and the author of *The Federal Funding of Social Knowledge Production and Application*.

He received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Florida State University. He received a Master of Arts degree in history from New York University and a Master of Arts degree in political science from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.

Dr. Paul R. Lawrence is a Vice President with IBM's Business Consulting Services. He works with federal executives, helping them solve complex problems by applying solutions proven in similar government settings or the private sector.

Dr. Lawrence is also the Partner-in-Charge of the IBM Center for The Business of Government (www.businessofgovernment.org), which seeks to advance knowledge on how to improve public sector effectiveness. He hosts the weekly radio show, "The Business of Government Hour," heard on WJFK-FM 106.7 Saturdays, 9–10 a.m., where he interviews government leaders about their job, career, and vision for the future of government. Since the show began in 1999, he has interviewed 150 senior government leaders in the Clinton and Bush administrations. He is the editor of the *The Business of Government Journal*. He is also the co-editor of *Transforming Organizations* and the editor of the IBM Center for The Business of Government book series, which has produced 12 books on government management topics (www.rowmanlittlefield.com/series).

Dr. Lawrence has written extensively on technology and government and has testified before Congress and several state legislatures. He serves on the Board of Advisors of the Thomas Jefferson Public Policy Program at William and Mary and on the Washington, D.C. area Board of Directors of Junior Achievement. He was the chairman of the Board of Directors of the Private Sector Council and was a member of the Advisory Committee to the Virginia Assembly's Joint Committee on Technology and Science. He was twice selected by *Federal Computer Week* as one of the top 100 public service business leaders—in 2000 and in 2002.

Dr. Lawrence earned his Ph.D. in economics from Virginia Tech.

KEY CONTACT INFORMATION

To contact the contributors:

Judith E. Michaels
4910 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016
(202) 337-4666

e-mail: judedc@starpower.net

John H. Trattner
Senior Writer and Editor
Council for Excellence in Government
1301 K Street, NW
Suite 450 West
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 728-0418

e-mail: jtrattner@excelgov.org

Dana Michael Harsell
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Hartwick College
Oneonta, NY 13820
(607) 431-4242

e-mail: harselld@hartwick.edu

Mark A. Abramson
Executive Director
IBM Center for The Business of Government
1301 K Street, NW
Fourth Floor, West Tower
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 515-4504
fax: (202) 515-4375

e-mail: mark.abramson@us.ibm.com

Paul R. Lawrence
Partner-in-Charge
IBM Center for The Business of Government
6710 Rockledge Drive
Bethesda, MD 20817
(301) 803-6450

e-mail: paul.lawrence@us.ibm.com

COLLABORATION: PARTNERSHIPS AND NETWORKS

Leveraging Networks to Meet National Goals: FEMA and the Safe Construction Networks (March 2002)
William L. Waugh, Jr.

21st-Century Government and the Challenge of Homeland Defense (June 2002)
Elaine C. Kamarck

Assessing Partnerships: New Forms of Collaboration (March 2003)
Robert Klitgaard and Gregory F. Treverton

Leveraging Networks: A Guide for Public Managers Working across Organizations (March 2003)
Robert Agranoff

Extraordinary Results on National Goals: Networks and Partnerships in the Bureau of Primary Health Care's 100%/0 Campaign (March 2003)
John Scanlon

Public-Private Strategic Partnerships: The U.S. Postal Service-Federal Express Alliance (May 2003)
Oded Shenkar

The Challenge of Coordinating "Big Science" (July 2003)
W. Henry Lambright

Communities of Practice: A New Tool for Government Managers (November 2003)
William M. Snyder and Xavier de Souza Briggs

Collaboration and Performance Management in Network Settings: Lessons from Three Watershed Governance Efforts (April 2004)
Mark T. Imperial

E-GOVERNMENT

Supercharging the Employment Agency: An Investigation of the Use of Information and Communication Technology to Improve the Service of State Employment Agencies (December 2000)
Anthony M. Townsend

Assessing a State's Readiness for Global Electronic Commerce: Lessons from the Ohio Experience (January 2001)
J. Pari Sabety and Steven I. Gordon

Privacy Strategies for Electronic Government (January 2001)
Janine S. Hiller and France Bélanger

Commerce Comes to Government on the Desktop: E-Commerce Applications in the Public Sector (February 2001)
Genie N. L. Stowers

The Use of the Internet in Government Service Delivery (February 2001)
Steven Cohen and William Eimicke

State Web Portals: Delivering and Financing E-Service (January 2002)
Diana Burley Gant, Jon P. Gant, and Craig L. Johnson

Internet Voting: Bringing Elections to the Desktop (February 2002)
Robert S. Done

Leveraging Technology in the Service of Diplomacy: Innovation in the Department of State (March 2002)
Barry Fulton

Federal Intranet Work Sites: An Interim Assessment (June 2002)
Julianne G. Mahler and Priscilla M. Regan

The State of Federal Websites: The Pursuit of Excellence (August 2002)
Genie N. L. Stowers

State Government E-Procurement in the Information Age: Issues, Practices, and Trends (September 2002)
M. Jae Moon

Preparing for Wireless and Mobile Technologies in Government (October 2002)
Ai-Mei Chang and P. K. Kannan

Public-Sector Information Security: A Call to Action for Public-Sector CIOs (October 2002, 2nd ed.)
Don Heiman

The Auction Model: How the Public Sector Can Leverage the Power of E-Commerce Through Dynamic Pricing (November 2002, 2nd ed.)
David C. Wyld

The Promise of E-Learning in Africa: The Potential for Public-Private Partnerships (January 2003)
Norman LaRocque and Michael Latham

Digitally Integrating the Government Supply Chain: E-Procurement, E-Finance, and E-Logistics (February 2003)
Jacques S. Gansler, William Lucyshyn, and Kimberly M. Ross

Using Technology to Increase Citizen Participation in Government: The Use of Models and Simulation (April 2003)
John O'Looney

Seaport: Charting a New Course for Professional Services Acquisition for America's Navy (June 2003)
David C. Wyld

E-Reporting: Strengthening Democratic Accountability (February 2004)
Mordecai Lee

Understanding Electronic Signatures: The Key to E-Government (March 2004)
Stephen H. Holden

Measuring the Performance of E-Government (March 2004)
Genie N. L. Stowers

Restoring Trust in Government: The Potential of Digital Citizen Participation (August 2004)
Marc Holzer, James Melitski, Seung-Yong Rho, and Richard Schwester

From E-Government to M-Government? Emerging Practices in the Use of Mobile Technology by State Governments (November 2004)
M. Jae Moon

Government Garage Sales: Online Auctions as Tools for Asset Management (November 2004)
David C. Wyld

Innovation in E-Procurement: The Italian Experience (November 2004)
Mita Marra

CENTER REPORTS AVAILABLE

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Credit Scoring and Loan Scoring: Tools for Improved Management of Federal Credit Programs (July 1999)
Thomas H. Stanton

Using Activity-Based Costing to Manage More Effectively (January 2000)
Michael H. Granof, David E. Platt, and Igor Vaysman

Audited Financial Statements: Getting and Sustaining "Clean" Opinions (July 2001)
Douglas A. Brook

An Introduction to Financial Risk Management in Government (August 2001)
Richard J. Buttimer, Jr.

Understanding Federal Asset Management: An Agenda for Reform (July 2003)
Thomas H. Stanton

Efficiency Counts: Developing the Capacity to Manage Costs at Air Force Materiel Command (August 2003)
Michael Barzelay and Fred Thompson

HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

Profiles in Excellence: Conversations with the Best of America's Career Executive Service (November 1999)
Mark W. Huddleston

Reflections on Mobility: Case Studies of Six Federal Executives (May 2000)
Michael D. Serlin

Managing Telecommuting in the Federal Government: An Interim Report (June 2000)
Gina Vega and Louis Brennan

Using Virtual Teams to Manage Complex Projects: A Case Study of the Radioactive Waste Management Project (August 2000)
Samuel M. DeMarie

A Learning-Based Approach to Leading Change (December 2000)
Barry Sugarman

Labor-Management Partnerships: A New Approach to Collaborative Management (July 2001)
Barry Rubin and Richard Rubin

Winning the Best and Brightest: Increasing the Attraction of Public Service (July 2001)
Carol Chetkovich

A Weapon in the War for Talent: Using Special Authorities to Recruit Crucial Personnel (December 2001)
Hal G. Rainey

A Changing Workforce: Understanding Diversity Programs in the Federal Government (December 2001)
Katherine C. Naff and J. Edward Kellough

Life after Civil Service Reform: The Texas, Georgia, and Florida Experiences (October 2002)
Jonathan Walters

The Defense Leadership and Management Program: Taking Career Development Seriously (December 2002)
Joseph A. Ferrara and Mark C. Rom

The Influence of Organizational Commitment on Officer Retention: A 12-Year Study of U.S. Army Officers (December 2002)
Stephanie C. Payne, Ann H. Huffman, and Trueman R. Tremble, Jr.

Human Capital Reform: 21st Century Requirements for the United States Agency for International Development (March 2003)
Anthony C. E. Quainton and Amanda M. Fulmer

Modernizing Human Resource Management in the Federal Government: The IRS Model (April 2003)
James R. Thompson and Hal G. Rainey

Mediation at Work: Transforming Workplace Conflict at the United States Postal Service (October 2003)
Lisa B. Bingham

Growing Leaders for Public Service (August 2004, 2nd ed.)
Ray Blunt

Pay for Performance: A Guide for Federal Managers (November 2004)
Howard Risher

INNOVATION

Managing Workfare: The Case of the Work Experience Program in the New York City Parks Department (June 1999)
Steven Cohen

New Tools for Improving Government Regulation: An Assessment of Emissions Trading and Other Market-Based Regulatory Tools (October 1999)
Gary C. Bryner

Religious Organizations, Anti-Poverty Relief, and Charitable Choice: A Feasibility Study of Faith-Based Welfare Reform in Mississippi (November 1999)
John P. Bartkowski and Helen A. Regis

Business Improvement Districts and Innovative Service Delivery (November 1999)
Jerry Mitchell

An Assessment of Brownfield Redevelopment Policies: The Michigan Experience (November 1999)
Richard C. Hula

San Diego County's Innovation Program: Using Competition and a Whole Lot More to Improve Public Services (January 2000)
William B. Eimicke

Innovation in the Administration of Public Airports (March 2000)
Scott E. Tarry

Entrepreneurial Government: Bureaucrats as Businesspeople (May 2000)
Anne Laurent

Rethinking U.S. Environmental Protection Policy: Management Challenges for a New Administration (November 2000)
Dennis A. Rondinelli

The Challenge of Innovating in Government (February 2001)
Sandford Borins

Understanding Innovation: What Inspires It? What Makes It Successful? (December 2001)
Jonathan Walters

Government Management of Information Mega-Technology: Lessons from the Internal Revenue Service's Tax Systems Modernization (March 2002)
Barry Bozeman

Advancing High End Computing: Linking to National Goals (September 2003)
Juan D. Rogers and Barry Bozeman

MANAGING FOR PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS

Corporate Strategic Planning in Government: Lessons from the United States Air Force (November 2000)
Colin Campbell

Using Evaluation to Support Performance Management: A Guide for Federal Executives (January 2001)
Kathryn Newcomer and Mary Ann Scheirer

Managing for Outcomes: Milestone Contracting in Oklahoma (January 2001)
Peter Frumkin

The Challenge of Developing Cross-Agency Measures: A Case Study of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (August 2001)
Patrick J. Murphy and John Carnevale

The Potential of the Government Performance and Results Act as a Tool to Manage Third-Party Government (August 2001)
David G. Frederickson

Using Performance Data for Accountability: The New York City Police Department's CompStat Model of Police Management (August 2001)
Paul E. O'Connell

Moving Toward More Capable Government: A Guide to Organizational Design (June 2002)
Thomas H. Stanton

The Baltimore CitiStat Program: Performance and Accountability (May 2003)
Lenneal J. Henderson

Strategies for Using State Information: Measuring and Improving Program Performance (December 2003)
Shelley H. Metzenbaum

Linking Performance and Budgeting: Opportunities in the Federal Budget Process (January 2004, 2nd ed.)
Philip G. Joyce

How Federal Programs Use Outcome Information: Opportunities for Federal Managers (February 2004, 2nd ed.)
Harry P. Hatry, Elaine Morley, Shelli B. Rossman, and Joseph S. Wholey

Performance Leadership: 11 Better Practices That Can Ratchet Up Performance (May 2004)
Robert D. Behn

Performance Management for Career Executives: A "Start Where You Are, Use What You Have" Guide (October 2004, 2nd ed.)
Chris Wye

Staying the Course: The Use of Performance Measurement in State Governments (November 2004)
Julia Melkers and Katherine Willoughby

MARKET-BASED GOVERNMENT

Determining a Level Playing Field for Public-Private Competition (November 1999)
Lawrence L. Martin

Implementing State Contracts for Social Services: An Assessment of the Kansas Experience (May 2000)
Jocelyn M. Johnston and Barbara S. Romzek

A Vision of the Government as a World-Class Buyer: Major Procurement Issues for the Coming Decade (January 2002)
Jacques S. Gansler

Contracting for the 21st Century: A Partnership Model (January 2002)
Wendell C. Lawther

Franchise Funds in the Federal Government: Ending the Monopoly in Service Provision (February 2002)
John J. Callahan

Making Performance-Based Contracting Perform: What the Federal Government Can Learn from State and Local Governments (November 2002, 2nd ed.)
Lawrence L. Martin

Moving to Public-Private Partnerships: Learning from Experience around the World (February 2003)
Trefor P. Williams

IT Outsourcing: A Primer for Public Managers (February 2003)
Yu-Che Chen and James Perry

The Procurement Partnership Model: Moving to a Team-Based Approach (February 2003)
Kathryn G. Denhardt

Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of Government as the Provider (March 2004, 2nd ed.)
Jacques S. Gansler

Transborder Service Systems: Pathways for Innovation or Threats to Accountability? (March 2004)
Alasdair Roberts

Competitive Sourcing: What Happens to Federal Employees? (October 2004)
Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn

CENTER REPORTS AVAILABLE

Implementing Alternative Sourcing Strategies: Four Case Studies (October 2004)
Edited by Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn

Designing Competitive Bidding for Medicare (November 2004)
John Cawley and Andrew B. Whitford

TRANSFORMATION OF ORGANIZATIONS

The Importance of Leadership: The Role of School Principals (September 1999)
Paul Teske and Mark Schneider

Leadership for Change: Case Studies in American Local Government (September 1999)
Robert B. Denhardt and Janet Vinzant Denhardt

Managing Decentralized Departments: The Case of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (October 1999)
Beryl A. Radin

Transforming Government: The Renewal and Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (April 2000)
R. Steven Daniels and Carolyn L. Clark-Daniels

Transforming Government: Creating the New Defense Procurement System (April 2000)
Kimberly A. Harokopus

Trans-Atlantic Experiences in Health Reform: The United Kingdom's National Health Service and the United States Veterans Health Administration (May 2000)
Marilyn A. DeLuca

Transforming Government: The Revitalization of the Veterans Health Administration (June 2000)
Gary J. Young

The Challenge of Managing Across Boundaries: The Case of the Office of the Secretary in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (November 2000)
Beryl A. Radin

Creating a Culture of Innovation: 10 Lessons from America's Best Run City (January 2001)
Janet Vinzant Denhardt and Robert B. Denhardt

Transforming Government: Dan Goldin and the Remaking of NASA (March 2001)
W. Henry Lambright

Managing Across Boundaries: A Case Study of Dr. Helene Gayle and the AIDS Epidemic (January 2002)
Norma M. Riccucci

Managing "Big Science": A Case Study of the Human Genome Project (March 2002)
W. Henry Lambright

The Power of Frontline Workers in Transforming Government: The Upstate New York Veterans Healthcare Network (April 2003)
Timothy J. Hoff

Making Public Sector Mergers Work: Lessons Learned (August 2003)
Peter Frumkin

Efficiency Counts: Developing the Capacity to Manage Costs at Air Force Materiel Command (August 2003)
Michael Barzelay and Fred Thompson

Managing the New Multipurpose, Multidiscipline University Research Centers: Institutional Innovation in the Academic Community (November 2003)
Barry Bozeman and P. Craig Boardman

2004 PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION SERIES

Government Reorganization: Strategies and Tools to Get It Done (August 2004)
Hannah Sistare

Performance Management for Political Executives: A "Start Where You Are, Use What You Have" Guide (October 2004)
Chris Wye

Becoming an Effective Political Executive: 7 Lessons from Experienced Appointees (January 2005, 2nd ed.)
Judith E. Michaels

Getting to Know You: Rules of Engagement for Political Appointees and Career Executives (January 2005)
Joseph A. Ferrara and Lynn C. Ross

SPECIAL REPORTS

Enhancing Security Throughout the Supply Chain (April 2004)
David J. Closs and Edmund F. McGarrell

CENTER FOR HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT REPORTS

The Power of Frontline Workers in Transforming Healthcare Organizations: The Upstate New York Veterans Healthcare Network (December 2003)
Timothy J. Hoff

IT Outsourcing: A Primer for Healthcare Managers (December 2003)
Yu-Che Chen and James Perry

BOOKS*

Collaboration: Using Networks and Partnerships
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004)
John M. Kamensky and Thomas J. Burlin, editors

E-Government 2001
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001)
Mark A. Abramson and Grady E. Means, editors

E-Government 2003
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002)
Mark A. Abramson and Therese L. Morin, editors

Human Capital 2002
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002)
Mark A. Abramson and Nicole Willenz Gardner, editors

Human Capital 2004
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004)
Jonathan D. Breul and Nicole Willenz Gardner, editors

Innovation
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002)
Mark A. Abramson and Ian Littman, editors

Leaders
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002)
Mark A. Abramson and Kevin M. Bacon, editors

Managing for Results 2002 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001)
Mark A. Abramson and John M. Kamensky, editors

Managing for Results 2005
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004)
John M. Kamensky and Albert Morales, editors

Memos to the President: Management Advice from the Nation's Top Public Administrators
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001)
Mark A. Abramson, editor

New Ways of Doing Business
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003)
Mark A. Abramson and Ann M. Kieffaber, editors

The Procurement Revolution
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003)
Mark A. Abramson and Roland S. Harris III, editors

Transforming Government Supply Chain Management
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003)
Jacques S. Gansler and Robert E. Luby, Jr., editors

Transforming Organizations
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001)
Mark A. Abramson and Paul R. Lawrence, editors

* Available at bookstores, online booksellers, and from the publisher (www.rowmanlittlefield.com or 800-462-6420).

About the IBM Center for The Business of Government

Through research stipends and events, the IBM Center for The Business of Government stimulates research and facilitates discussion on new approaches to improving the effectiveness of government at the federal, state, local, and international levels.

The Center is one of the ways that IBM seeks to advance knowledge on how to improve public sector effectiveness. The IBM Center focuses on the future of the operation and management of the public sector.

About IBM Business Consulting Services

With consultants and professional staff in more than 160 countries globally, IBM Business Consulting Services is the world's largest consulting services organization. IBM Business Consulting Services provides clients with business process and industry expertise, a deep understanding of technology solutions that address specific industry issues, and the ability to design, build and run those solutions in a way that delivers bottom-line business value. For more information visit www.ibm.com/bcs.

For additional information, contact:
Mark A. Abramson
Executive Director
IBM Center for The Business of Government
1301 K Street, NW
Fourth Floor, West Tower
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 515-4504, fax: (202) 515-4375

e-mail: businessofgovernment@us.ibm.com
website: www.businessofgovernment.org

IBM Center for
The Business of Government

1301 K Street, NW
Fourth Floor, West Tower
Washington, DC 20005